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Abstract
Reliable Software Updates for On-orbit CubeSat Satellites
Sean Fitzsimmons
CubeSat satellites have redefined the standard solution for conducting
missions in space due to their unique form factor and cost. The harsh
environment of space necessitates examining features that improve
satellite robustness and ultimately extend lifetime, which is typical
and vital for mission success. The CubeSat development team at Cal
Poly, PolySat, has recently redefined its standard avionics platform
to support more complex mission capabilities with this robustness in
mind. A significant addition was the integration of the Linux op-
erating system, which provides the flexibility to develop much more
elaborate protection mechanisms within software, such as support for
remote on-orbit software updates.
This thesis details the design and development of such a feature-set
with critical software recovery and multiple-mission single-CubeSat
functionality in mind. As a result, features that focus on software
update usability, validation, system recovery, upset tolerance, and
extensibility have been developed. These include backup Linux kernel
and file system image availability, image validation prior to boot, and
the use of multiple file system devices to protect against system upsets.
Furthermore, each feature has been designed for usability on current
and future missions.
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1Introduction
1.1 CubeSat
Depending on its mission, a spacecraft may range in physical size and cost drasti-
cally. Typically, satellites serve a multitude of purposes, such as providing interac-
tive television entertainment, or providing communication services like broadband
Internet support [1]. Developed in 1999 by aerospace engineering professor Jordi
Puig-Suari from Cal Poly and professor Bob Twiggs from Stanford at the time [2],
the CubeSat specification completely redefined the common spacecraft model in
terms of physical size, affordability, and development time. This standard pre-
sented an extremely unique hands-on opportunity for academia to develop and
operate their own satellites. Due to these factors, the use of CubeSats has become
widespread and continues to grow in both the industrial and educational realms
today.
The CubeSat is characterized as a pico-satellite with a volume of 1000cm3, and
mass of no more than 1kg [3]. Because of these restrictions, utilizing a CubeSat’s
volume efficiently requires some creativity. These satellites typically use the same
core hardware platform, or the same avionics system with differing payloads to
support various missions (e.g., additional payload hardware to support imaging
capabilities). This allows developers to reuse previously designed systems on
subsequent missions, or to share designs with other developers. Throughout
years of designing for various missions, developers have realized that maximizing
potential payload volume is crucial as missions become more complex.
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In addition to defining this specification, Cal Poly has developed a standard
launch-vehicle deployer for CubeSats, the Poly Pico-satellite Orbital Deployer, or
P-POD. A single P-POD can house up to three 1U, or 10x10x10cm CubeSats for
deployment, as well as other varieties of this form factor (e.g., one 3U). Typically,
multiple P-PODs are integrated as a secondary payload onto a launch vehicle that
contains a primary payload. Combined with the CubeSat standard, the P-POD
provides an attractive opportunity for people to develop and operate satellites
quickly and affordably.
1.2 PolySat
PolySat, Cal Poly’s CubeSat development group, began researching and designing
CubeSat spacecraft shortly after the specification was defined and continues to
today. This team has grown knowledgable in the field over the past decade and
continues to progress in redefining mission capabilities for Cal Poly CubeSats.
To date, PolySat has developed six pico-satellites, two of which are in orbit,
CP3 and CP4, and the team continues to develop for new missions annually.
PolySat’s previous missions, CP1 through CP6, all employed essentially the same
avionics system for radio frequency (RF) communication, power, and data han-
dling. An image of PolySat’s CP4 can be seen in Figure 1.1:
Figure 1.1: CP4 post-PPOD deployment - This image of CP4 was captured
by Aerospace Corporation’s AeroCube-2 CubeSat shortly after P-POD deployment.
2
1.3 Previous and New Generation Avionics
Systems
In the past year, PolySat has designed a more robust, power efficient, and
computationally-capable platform to support more complex and demanding mis-
sion capabilities. Comparisons of these two avionics systems are discussed in the
next section.
1.3 Previous and New Generation Avionics
Systems
Prior to redesigning the avionics system, PolySat utilized a hardware platform
consisting of multiple electrical boards each managing various subsystems on the
spacecraft. This system contained redundant hardware for RF communication,
as well as relatively straight-forward custom firmware for all its microcontrollers.
Each of these microcontrollers typically managed the spacecraft’s RF, command
and data-handling (C&DH), or payload subsystem functionalities. A block dia-
gram overview of this avionics architecture can be seen in Figure 1.2.
Core Avionics
COMM 
A
COMM 
B
C&DH
Payload
Independent
Controller and
Electronics
Electrical
Power System
Figure 1.2: First Generation Avionics - This block diagram presents an
overview of the original avionics architecture.
In summary, the C&DH is responsible for main operation of the spacecraft,
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including remote command acceptance and response. The payload subsystem
manages the data flow and control of specific scientific or experimental mission
hardware. Although this avionics system has spaceflight heritage, it has encoun-
tered a variety of anomalies, and its use of limited volume is far from effective for
currently desired payloads.
While developing the next generation avionics platform, both hardware and
software redesign decisions were considered due to previously experienced limi-
tations. First, the current hardware consumed almost a third of the CubeSat’s
available volume, which minimized payload potential. Secondly, the software was
not developed in a modular fashion, thus making it inflexible when developing
between missions. Additionally, as seen from results of the previous CPX mis-
sions [4], redundant microcontroller units further increased complexity and may
potentially have caused on-orbit failures. This outweighs the benefit of what the
duplicate hardware intended to provide: robustness.
To remedy these issues and also support future complex missions, the new
avionics system volume was reduced considerably by integrating multiple subsys-
tems together with a single high-performance and low-power microprocessor. As
a result, the complexity incurred by utilizing redundant hardware was essentially
removed. The avionics software architecture was redesigned to employ the use
of the Linux operating system (OS) and to enable more flexible and extensible
software development between missions. Lastly, this powerful microprocessor can
potentially act as a payload controller in addition to supporting the C&DH and
communication subsystems. This prevents the need to use an individual proces-
sor purely for payload control. A summary of the major differences between these
avionics systems is shown in Table 1.1 [4].
Table 1.1: Avionics Design Comparison
Revision Processor Clock Non-volatile Mem. OS Volume
1 3x PIC18 4 MHz 256 KB Custom 0.25 L
2 AT91SAM9 400 MHz 528 MB Linux 0.1 L
4
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1.4 Robust CubeSat Design Goal
Hazards in the space environment can range from ionizing radiation to extreme
hot and cold temperature exposure, and thus, examining features that protect
the spacecraft to improve its robustness are important to mission success. In
the new generation avionics, these solutions have exhibited upgrades from the
previous design and now exist in both hardware and software. For example, a
hardware watchdog used to passively detect improper software operation now
includes a secondary long duration watchdog in case of failure. Additionally, the
new avionics has incorporated a software architecture redesign, which provides the
flexibility to develop more elaborate protection mechanisms that were infeasible
in the past.
Since radiation exposure presents a serious problem for spacecrafts and can
cause damaging effects commonly known as single-event latchups (SEL) or single-
event upsets (SEU) [5], features to limit harm from its exposure have been con-
sidered. Either of these events can disrupt proper operation of the software and
considering methods to reduce the risk of single or cascading system failures from
such events is crucial. The redesigned software architecture now includes some so-
lutions to handle potential radiation effects, such as a software watchdog process
designed to detect basic system software anomalies and correct them. Another
solution is the use of backup OS images in case of transient or permanent memory
failure. The latter solution was developed as part of this thesis, and it is discussed
in further detail later.
Despite risks imposed by the harsh space environment, human error will also
limit mission success. This may occur due to an unforeseen circumstance not
considered in the mission software development, or an inaccurate software model
discovered during orbit. Currently, most flight software applications are installed
a final time prior to orbit with hopes of only encountering limited (i.e., not mission
jeopardizing) issues, if any, that were not discovered during integrated testing on
the ground. However, this software development model is not entirely reliable and
fortunately, this new platform facilitates the development of a solution to handle
such potential errors. This solution is on-orbit software update functionality,
which includes support for the Linux kernel, root file system, or both if necessary.
5
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This feature will both improve the system’s robustness and also provide a
tremendously beneficial capability to increase mission potential: attempting to
complete multiple missions rather than a single mission per developed CubeSat.
Although mission development typically requires a fully tested and integrated
system for a single payload experiment, this flexibility would allow multiple pay-
loads or even a single primary payload with incomplete flight software to fly. This
feature-set would only require minimal software functionality prior to flight, and
final payload experiment software could be completed well after development of
the CubeSat hardware.
1.5 Thesis Scope
The scope of this work includes the design and development of reliable remote
on-orbit software update functionality. There are two main focuses, which in-
clude software update validation, and recovery from potentially non-functional
or inoperable updates. The major goal is to extend the reliability and capabili-
ties of PolySat’s new generation avionics, both in terms of post-launch software
error recovery and potential expansion of a mission’s feature-set. Much of this
implementation relies heavily on hardware or software architecture details of the
avionics system, some of which were designed by other participating PolySat stu-
dents. Their contributions and work are outlined below, as well as identified at
the start of any chapter that may reference such contributions. Works related to
this research have also been identified and discussed, as they have aided in the
design.
This thesis contains six additional chapters, each of which is summarized
below:
• Chapter 2 describes a development platform architecture used during initial
avionics development, whose understanding was crucial for the design of a
software update architecture. Investigation of the development platform
architecture, which included obtaining information about the boot process
and memory hierarchy options, was conducted by other team members in-
cluding myself, Greg Manyak, and John M. Bellardo. The limitations and
6
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risks addressed were part of an evaluation of the development board archi-
tecture performed solely as part of this thesis.
• Chapter 3 describes the avionics platform architecture as well as architec-
ture for the software update feature-set, including validation, recovery, and
an updated system boot process. The avionics platform hardware was de-
signed by Austin Williams, which included device component selection and
hardware testing to ultimately form a stable platform that could support
software development. The software update architecture, which includes
the integration and design of multiple software subsystems, was designed
solely as part of this thesis.
• Chapter 4 details the design and implementation for critical software up-
date subsystems or modules that are briefly discussed in Chapter 3. These
three subsystems, including their design, implementation, and testing were
completed solely as part of this thesis.
• Chapter 5 presents results from verification testing of the core design fea-
tures, including performance measurements and requirements compliance.
• Chapter 6 evaluates works related to this research that were considered
during the design phase.
• Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with a focus on the current development
progress and potential future work.
7
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2Development Platform
Architecture
While initially developing the new avionics hardware, a major amount of devel-
opment support for the chosen microprocessor was obtained from a preexisting
development board available from the manufacturer. This support included ob-
taining information about memory bus interconnects and attractive memory de-
vices supported by the microprocessor. This information assisted in determining
whether these devices should be included on the avionics. Ultimately, the new
avionics platform was designed to contain several elements similar to the devel-
opment platform, whose understanding was crucial to develop software update
functionality. More specifically, these items include the memory device architec-
ture and startup process, as they have implications on the design choices made
in the software update system architecture.
Initial investigation of the memory device architecture, available options, and
boot process on the development platform was conducted by Greg Manyak. Fur-
ther investigation and evaluation of its implications on the avionics platform,
as well as recommendations of how each memory device should be used on the
avionics were conducted as part of this thesis. The final design decisions regarding
hardware aspects for the avionics, such as specific memory component selection,
were made by Austin Williams.
9
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2.1 Platform Overview
The manufacturer of the newly chosen microprocessor, Atmel R©, provides a con-
venient introductory development board option that was used extensively for ini-
tial avionics development. This system-on-a-chip, or SoC, the AT91SAM9G20,
incorporates an ARM9 based architecture, specifically the ARM926EJ-S proces-
sor (v5), and it includes a variety of features, such as standard peripheral bus
interfaces. The development unit also includes different potential primary and
secondary non-volatile memory options. All of these options were heavily con-
sidered to be included on the new avionics due to their flexible use with the
AT91SAM9G20, as well as individual tradeoffs. A block diagram presenting the
critical elements of the AT91SAM9G20 platform architecture is presented in Fig-
ure 2.1 below [6]:
AT91SAM9G20-EK Dev. Unit
AT91SAM9G20
32K 
SRAM
64K
ROM
32 MB
SDRAM
256 MB
NAND
32 8
Shared parallel bus
uSD
8 MB
Dataflash
MMC
SPI
Figure 2.1: AT91SAM9G20 Platform Overview - This block diagram illus-
trates the various non-volatile, volatile, internal, and external memory devices and
their interfaces to the avionics microprocessor.
An understanding of these memory options and how they can support various
embedded applications is discussed.
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2.2 Memory Organization
The number of external non-volatile memory devices available on the development
platform allows for up to three primary methodologies for storing and booting
Linux, as well as storing other desired data. These devices include NOR and
NAND flash components, and a potential microSD card component. The phys-
ical differences and limitations between NAND and NOR flash components are
important to consider, and these are described in a future section. The Atmel R©
NOR flash device is also known as Dataflash R©, which is a specific technology
name dedicated to external NOR flash devices included with the AT91 family of
hardware [7].
On the AT91SAM9G20 development board, every external memory device
has varying capacity and interfaces: 8MB Dataflash R© with a serial peripheral
interface (SPI), 256MB NAND flash with an 8-bit parallel interface, up to 32GB
microSD (non-SDHC required to utilize as a boot device) with a MultiMediaCard
interface (MMC), and 32MB volatile SDRAM with a standard parallel interface.
Typically, one of these non-volatile external memory devices is utilized as the
primary boot device, which allows for three boot device options. This boot device
contains primary dependencies for Linux, as well as other startup dependencies.
Any remaining non-volatile memory devices can be used for secondary or tertiary
data storage.
The primary AT91 Linux support group as well as the microprocessor man-
ual [6, 8] detail the variety of system memory and boot options available to the
user, including a commonly recommended option used during early development.
This option was to utilize NAND flash as the primary boot and secondary data
storage device. In this configuration, the NAND flash contains all the primary
Linux components, as well as other startup dependencies. A sample memory
content mapping for such a configuration is shown in Figure 2.2 [8].
The primary components that make up Linux are commonly known as a sys-
tem images, which are compressed files containing specific elements of the Linux
OS. These main images include the kernel, which is actually the core of the OS,
and secondly, what’s known as the root file system. The kernel is a separate pro-
gram that executes in volatile memory, and it is responsible for hardware control,
11
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NAND Flash Contents
AT91
Bootstrap U-Boot
U-Boot
Env.
Linux 
Kernel
0x0 0x10000000
Linux 
File System
Figure 2.2: Potential NAND Memory Layout - This diagram illustrates a
content mapping of NAND flash that could be used with the AT91SAM9G20.
system scheduling, and system I/O after full system startup. The root file sys-
tem is actually the primary directory and file tree hierarchy that contains all the
dependencies the system needs to properly run, such as other programs, libraries,
and modules. The default file system utilized with this configuration is a journal-
ing flash file system, or JFFS2 [9]. By maintaining these two primary components
into separate image files, the Linux dependencies are essentially organized and
simpler to program or flash onto the target hardware. For this NAND flash con-
figuration, the kernel image size was roughly 1.5MB in size, and the initial root
file system size was roughly 15MB.
In addition to these critical elements is the bootstrap program, which exists
as a multi-stage program. More specifically, two of these stages are the AT91
bootstrap and U-Boot. These stages are all primary components necessary for
startup and full system boot.
2.3 Boot Process
Bootloaders, or bootstrap programs are typically required with hardware that
uses an operating system. They will execute as the hardware is initially powered
and usually reside on a processor-internal ROM or similar device. Their primary
responsibility is to perform low-level hardware initialization for devices such as
memory or oscillators, which are necessary prior to loading an actual OS. In the
case of the AT91SAM9G20, it contains an internal bootstrap program (a.k.a,
RomBoot) on its 64KB ROM, which performs these tasks at a minimal level.
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Utilizing the internal bootstrap is actually not required with the microproces-
sor and an external 16-bit flash memory device can be used instead. However, this
requires the user to provide an independent firmware solution that will perform
the necessary low-level configuration. This application must also be able to exe-
cute in place, which means it does not require content copying to RAM [10]. The
option to choose between the processor’s internal bootstrap or external bootstrap
is hardware configurable using one of the microprocessor’s external pins known
as the Boot Memory Selection, or BMS pin. To avoid the inconvenience of hav-
ing to develop a first-stage bootstrap solution for the development platform, the
processor was configured to always boot using its preexisting internal bootstrap.
By design, this internal bootloader only acts as a first-stage program, which
results in a very limited hardware configuration when done executing. This inter-
nal bootstrap can support multiple primary boot devices dynamically, and it will
actually attempt to search and detect a suitable second-stage bootstrap program
that can be loaded from other external memory devices. When the first-stage
completes execution, control is handed to the second-stage bootstrap, which is
ultimately responsible for loading the OS. By default, this second-stage bootstrap
program for the development board is developed by Atmel R© and known as AT91
Bootstrap.
On startup, the internal bootstrap immediately probes the SPI, parallel, and
MMC buses for external memory devices that may contain a valid program ex-
ecutable (i.e., contains a valid ARM instruction code sequence). If one is dis-
covered, it is copied into internal SRAM and system startup continues. Two
independent 16KB banks of SRAM exist in the microprocessor which altogether
may be used for the second-stage bootstrap since the internal first-stage actually
executes in place via memory mapping.
After the first-stage completes scanning, if a valid bootstrap executable has
not been detected or perhaps no external memory devices exist, an in-system
programming utility also contained within the internal ROM is loaded. This
is known as SAM-BA, and this executes and awaits any activity on the main
microprocessor’s USB device or debug RS232 serial port. This allows the system
to be reprogrammed or perhaps troubleshooted in the event that the user may
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not want to fully boot the system. A flow diagram depicting the overall behavior
of the AT91 first-stage internal bootstrap is show in Figure 2.3 [6, 10].
Lastly, U-Boot is an optional third-stage bootstrap following the second-stage
AT91 Bootstrap that manages other setup and passing control to the Linux OS
when finished executing. U-Boot is known as a Universal Boot Loader, and it
supports several other processors including many from the AT91 family. Al-
though U-Boot’s configuration, which mainly involves final steps in loading the
OS, can be handled by the AT91 Bootstrap standalone, such an option was not
readily available for the development board. Other information regarding Linux
dependencies (e.g., kernel image address offset in NAND) that are necessary to
boot exist in the U-Boot environment in memory.
A high-level diagram showing the overall flow of each of these stages in the
boot process is shown in Figure 2.4 [6, 8]. Aside from the first and second stages,
each stage is loaded into external SDRAM before executing, including the Linux
OS.
Since multiple memory device configurations are supported by the AT91SAM9G20,
the user can leverage this flexibility to design a specific startup sequence suited
to a desirable application. In the case of the avionics, a few primary memory
configurations were heavily considered due to their recommendations by online
support [8]. This included potentially utilizing NAND flash as a primary boot
and secondary data storage device. However, before finalizing the memory con-
tent layout for the avionics, a few common issues regarding these technologies
were considered.
2.4 Limitations and Risks
NAND and NOR memory technology have implications on the overall functional-
ity of the system that must be considered prior to their use. Unfortunately, they
suffer from a couple disadvantages. These memories primarily differ in their in-
ternal memory cell arrangement and thus, their potential capacities and low-level
interfaces differ significantly. NAND’s cell structure is only limited to multiple-
byte serial, rather than random single byte memory access and it can have greater
density. The opposite is actually true for NOR memory.
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Figure 2.3: Internal First-Stage Bootloader Flow Diagram - This depicts
the various buses probed by the first-stage bootloader application, which intends to
load a second-stage bootstrap into internal SRAM, or load the SAM-BA in-system
programming utility.
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Figure 2.4: High-Level Boot Process Flow Diagram - This illustrates the
various stages of the AT91 boot process.
Due to its larger capacity, NAND memory is organized into larger segments,
such as pages, and these define the smallest multiple-byte read or write access
portions (e.g., 1024 bytes) allowed from or to the device. Secondly, NAND’s
cell structure can degrade and wear-down over time due to frequent use, and
this limitation must be managed to improve overall device lifetime. Managing
this degradation is known as wear-leveling [11], which is a technique to handle
and limit the occurrences of forming unusable memory blocks on the device.
These issues are only briefly mentioned here but more detail regarding them are
presented in the next chapter and related works Section 6.2.2.
The default development board architecture employs a single 256MB NAND
flash device as a primary boot and secondary storage device. Given its capacity,
this could be feasible for several missions with reasonable data storage require-
ments, but this is not an ideal memory layout. Since electronic components are
susceptible to radiation induced upsets in space, relying on a single memory de-
vice to contain the primary Linux image components (i.e., Linux kernel and root
file system images) for a mission is quite risky and unreliable. Additionally, this
would result in all persistent memory-write activity occurring on a single device.
This increases the risk of data corruption from overlapping writes, perhaps due
to managing memory blocks, or failure of a memory protection mechanism within
Linux. Moreover, this device could become a single point of failure for the mission
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if it happens to fail entirely. Fortunately, the flexibility of the AT91SAM9G20
internal bootstrap allows for multiple memory device configurations. This has re-
sulted in a memory hierarchy on the avionics that utilizes an independent primary
boot memory device and independent secondary storage device.
Moving the critical Linux dependencies to a primary boot device does not
completely solve the reliability problem since this device could also fail. However,
such an event is less likely to occur on the avionics primary boot device due to
its unique technology. In short, the primary boot device does not depend on
standard electrical means to store bits as would a NAND device and thus, it
becomes less susceptible to radiation induced upsets.
Lastly, another risk encountered by using multiple external memory devices
is the increase in system complexity. By utilizing a new primary boot device,
support for the device must be added to the existing AT91 Bootstrap and poten-
tially U-Boot if not already existent. A more complicated boot process is then
needed that may result in a higher potential for error occurrence.
One main advantage to multiple memory devices, however, is the separation
of critical system components from a secondary storage system such as NAND.
This will help to prevent potential data corruption on a single memory device.
Secondly, there would no longer be a single memory device that could poten-
tially become inoperable and end a mission completely. This memory hierarchy
could tolerate a secondary storage device failure since it could now still fully
startup with the primary Linux components intact on a different device. These
advantages clearly outweigh the risk of the increased complexity that results from
adding an independent primary boot device.
Many of these concerns, including complexity and failure modes, have been
considered in the development of the software update architecture. Additionally,
a firm understanding of the details regarding the existing development platform,
such as boot process and memory hierarchy, was necessary to form a desirable
avionics software update solution.
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3New Avionics Platform
Architecture
After much consideration regarding potential memory architectures and boot
methodologies for the avionics system, the platform was actually designed very
similarly to its development unit predecessor. One key difference is that multiple
external memory devices are utilized rather than a single NAND device. A pri-
mary memory boot device is used to store primary boot components, including
Linux and its accompanying bootstrap. Since these platform architectures are so
similar, understanding the development unit has aided in the design of software
update features.
While considering software update functionality for this system, a few ma-
jor concerns came to mind. These items include but are not limited to update
validation, and potential recovery options if perhaps the update is inoperable
but still used by the system. Another major consideration is a remote uplink
or upload mechanism to support communication for an orbiting CubeSat. Since
communication windows with the spacecraft may only last a few minutes, it may
require multiple links, or ‘passes’ before a software update can be completely
uplinked. Although important, this last consideration is only briefly discussed
since multiple solutions to this problem are already available within Linux and
the preexisting avionics software architecture.
At a high level, multiple modules were developed to address these concerns,
one of which involves Linux image validation, either for pre-launch default system
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images, or updated ones. A recovery process has also been designed to aid in sys-
tem recovery if such functionality is ever necessary. The discussion of this avionics
platform architecture focuses on a new memory hierarchy, boot process, and how
each of the software update modules integrate within the platform. These soft-
ware update modules, including system state logs, secondary file system, and
final update application were developed as part of this thesis.
The choice to include multiple memory devices on the avionics unit was made
collaboratively by Austin Williams and Greg Manyak. Their primary uses in
comparison to the development platform architecture, including isolating a pri-
mary boot device, using multiple file systems, updating the boot procedure to
support validation and recovery as a two stage process, were developed as part
of this thesis.
3.1 Approach
The most desirable software update feature-set includes a reliable, robust, and
extensible system and thus, a variety of design decisions were necessary to achieve
these characteristics. Initially, a set of goals and requirements were established,
which presented the need to develop independent major subsystems that are archi-
tected to support such functionality. Elaboration of these goals and requirements
are discussed.
3.2 Goals
One main goal focuses on developing a reliable solution to update the avionics
system software. When referring to the system software, this means that any
critical Linux component, such as the kernel, should be updatable in addition to
other system files. To facilitate this, validation and recovery mechanisms must
exist.
Validation is necessary to ensure that the system can apply and use updates
properly. If these updates cannot be validated, upsets on the system can result
from attempting to use an update that does not contain valid data. Additionally,
the system must be able to recover in case this event occurs. Software update
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corruption may occur from other events, such as a bit-flip upset, so this validation
should generally apply to all Linux dependencies that exist on the system, whether
or not they are updates.
Since the space environment can present unpredictable resets within the sys-
tem, the software update functionality should tolerate these occurrences to a
reasonable degree. Minimally, any part of the software update process should not
upset the system further if an unexpected reset does occur.
Another major goal is to create an extensible solution that can be employed
on several future missions. Therefore, it only depends on a few major hardware
requirements that will unlikely change between missions, and rather, the software
has very minimal or no dependencies on any specific mission. A summary of these
major goals can be found in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Summary of Major System Goals
Goal Description
1 Update support for all major software components
2 Validation and any necessary recovery for all system updates
3 Reasonable tolerance of unexpected system upsets
4 Extensible solution for current and future missions
From these few major goals, a set of system requirements was generated.
3.3 System Requirements
The system requirements are organized into primary non-functional and func-
tional requirements. The non-functional requirements refer to desired character-
istics or attributes of the software update behavior as a whole, rather than what
the actual system should be designed to do and perform. The latter are presented
as functional requirements in a section directly following the non-functional re-
quirements.
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3.3.1 Non-Functional Requirements
The primary non-functional requirement relates directly to the avionics platform.
This requirement states that the software updates should be fully compatible
with the Linux distribution, software architecture, and hardware architecture
on the avionics. The Linux distribution for the avionics is quite unique to the
hardware, and the underlying hardware is also organized with a specific hierarchy
and startup model. Unless the software update features are designed to function
on the new avionics platform, it would not be feasible to remotely update it.
The next requirement states that the system should support a reusable and
reliable remote uplink mechanism that can tolerate high latency. Since the com-
munication link window is typically limited in terms of duration and number
of occurrences per day, a solution to periodically collect transmitted data is re-
quired. This application or similar should validate this data and properly form it
into an update when complete. It would be most beneficial if this solution could
be reused on the avionics regardless of the mission that may want to support
software updates.
An dual extension of the previous requirement is that first, the avionics must
also contain communications hardware support in addition to a higher-level soft-
ware application to manage the communication link. Secondly, there must be
non-volatile memory storage available to temporarily contain software updates
until they are complete and then applied to the system. Without these sub-
systems, which include a hardware transceiver to receive and transmit RF data
packets, remote software updates to the avionics system would not be feasible.
Next, software updates for the avionics should have reasonably sized memory
footprints to account for their uplink time and limited non-volatile storage. If
updates were rather large in size, it may not be feasible to fit them onto an
existing memory device on the system, and more time would be consumed when
uplinking any updates to the system. Although a long latency software update
may be tolerable, if the update is immediately critical to mission success, the
avionics may not receive the update prior to a potential failure.
Furthermore, only minor changes, if any, should be required for subsequent
missions utilizing this avionics platform to perform software updates. In other
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words, the software update functionality should not only be usable on a single
mission, but flexible enough to be used on future missions.
The last non-functional requirement states that the actual updates should
have a specific format known by the system, whether that’s on a per-file basis,
or perhaps an entire compressed Linux image file. The software update system
can thus expect a specific set of potential update formats, which is ultimately
necessary to validate and apply the updates.
A summary of these non-functional system requirements can be found in Ta-
ble 3.2:
Table 3.2: Summary of Non-Functional Requirements
Requirement Description
1 Compatible with avionics software and hardware architectures
2 RF hardware support to receive and transmit packet data
3 Software support for high latency remote data transfer
4 Available non-volatile device for temporary update storage
5 Small memory footprint for software updates
6 Minor changes to support software updates for other missions
7 Specifically formatted updates
3.3.2 Functional Requirements
As for the functional requirements, the first states that the system should perform
recovery in case of non-functional or corrupt software update use. Although soft-
ware updates should be validated prior to the system applying them, they could
still become inoperable perhaps due to transient memory failure (e.g., transfer of
a complete software update between external memory devices). A system reset
would most likely be required for a critical system update to take effect, such
as updating a Linux component, so the avionics should recover from failure to
startup with an unusable update.
Secondly, the software update system should perform low-overhead and ro-
bust validation of any software updates prior to their use. Although remotely
transferred data typically utilizes protocols to perform validation on a per-packet
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basis, it’s appropriate to also validate the complete software update. This vali-
dation should not incur large delays on the system that may impact other com-
ponents. In other words, other important subsystems may depend on fair use of
the processor, and these validations should not impact their overall performance
negatively.
The next functional requirement states that the software update system should
tolerate unexpected global system upsets, such as unexpected reboots. If the
software update application process perhaps does not complete prior to a system
reset, this should not cause further errors upon system startup. Although this
goes hand-in-hand with the first functional requirement, there may be other com-
ponents aside from the update that are necessary to perform a software update
(e.g., a request to apply the update). If any of these components become invalid
due to a reset, the system should still allow for future updates and not upset the
avionics on subsequent startup.
The last functional requirement states that the software update system should
be able to apply the updates properly to the system when finally uplinked. If the
software update functionality could not apply the software updates, the updates
could not be used. A summary of these functional system requirements can be
found in Table 3.3:
Table 3.3: Summary of Functional Requirements
Requirement Description
1 System recovery for inoperable or corrupt software update use
2 Robust and low-overhead validation of software updates
3 Tolerance of unexpected system upsets during the update process
4 Application of software updates to the system
These sets of requirements have encouraged many of the architectural and
design decisions for software update functionality.
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3.4 Memory Organization
In comparison to the development platform architecture, the new avionics plat-
form utilizes a memory device layout that is almost identical aside from an ad-
ditional primary boot memory device. Important differences regarding actual
internal memory content organization and the primary boot device technology
are discussed.
3.4.1 Primary Boot Device
When deciding to use a separate primary boot device to store critical components,
such as Linux, the goals were to isolate these dependencies from a secondary
storage device and to reliably store them. Since the Linux images and bootstrap
dependencies are vital to any mission’s success, ensuring their validity on this
device is essential. The main concern with choosing the proper memory device is
considering its susceptibility to fluctuating radiation and temperature levels from
space. If highly susceptible to upset occurrences, these critical dependencies could
permanently corrupt and prevent proper system boot. Thus, a couple different
solutions were explored to store these software images reliably.
The first solution involved investigating a programmable read-only memory
(PROM) device, or one-time programmable read-only memory. These devices are
essentially a sequence of hardcoded bits burned into silicon using fuse or anti-fuse
technology to form internal electrical connectivity [12]. With this manufacturing
process, the structural integrity of the circuitry is unlikely to change. Thus, they
are essentially impervious to radiation induced state change like other common
electrical-based memory. Upon continued research, it became impractical to con-
sider this solution since it was expensive and not a widely available service by
national manufacturers. It would have also significantly increased the avionics
hardware complexity.
Next, the second and final solution was to utilize a low-cost and low-power
phase-changing memory device (PCM). Although the hardware designer had al-
ready chosen to use this device on the avionics, it was not clear at the time how
to use it most effectively. Further discussion of the chemical properties and the
inherit robustness of this technology is presented in related works Section 6.1.1 at
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the end of this paper. Due the overwhelming amount of research to commercialize
this technology in a low-cost and practical form, it became feasible to integrate
on the avionics platform. This device was chosen as a reliable option for storing
critical data because its technology is inherently tolerant to space environment
conditions.
3.4.2 Platform Overview
The avionics platform memory hierarchy has an external memory device layout
containing a 16MB capacity PCM device that stores the system’s primary Linux
images and bootstrap components. Additionally, there are 128MB SDRAM,
512MB NAND flash, and up to 32GB MMC devices utilized. A block diagram re-
flecting this layout is shown in Figure 3.1, whose differences from the development
platform architecture are highlighted.
Avionics Platform
AT91SAM9G20
32K 
SRAM
64K
ROM
128 MB
SDRAM
512 MB
NAND
32 8
Shared parallel bus
uSD
16 MB
PCM
MMC
SPI
Figure 3.1: Avionics Platform Overview - This block diagram illustrates
the various non-volatile, volatile, internal, and external memory devices and their
interfaces to the avionics microprocessor. Differences from the development unit
architecture are highlighted.
The SDRAM and NAND flash components only have minor differences from
the development unit architecture, which are slight increases in memory capacity.
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The avionics also supports a tertiary memory device, or uSD MMC interface for
up to 32GB additional storage. For missions requiring large amounts of data
acquisition, this option is readily available with a provided uSD card device.
On the development platform, the critical Linux components would be con-
tained as two compressed kernel and root file system images in NAND flash. The
total estimated memory footprint of these components is 16.5MB. In this configu-
ration, the Linux kernel is copied to SDRAM at startup, and the root file system
is simply mounted from NAND. Any file system change requests are always re-
flected due to the non-volatile nature of the NAND device. This startup and
Linux usage has influenced a couple key design decisions of the software update
architecture.
3.4.3 Multiple File Systems
On the development unit, individual memory footprints are approximately 1.5MB
compressed for the kernel image, and 15MB compressed for the root file system.
However, storing these Linux images similarly in the 16MB capacity PCM would
not be feasible given this memory footprint. Thus, the decision to separate the
larger root file system image into two independent file system images was made.
The first, the primary root file system, contains Linux dependencies that are
always required for system startup and that are necessary for mission critical
components. This primary file system is stored on the PCM device, and the file
system type is JFFS2. The secondary file system is designed only to contain
non-critical, convenient system files that should not be necessary to complete a
mission. This secondary file system consists mainly of larger file system compo-
nents and is stored on the NAND device as JFFS2. A sample of this memory
content configuration is shown in Figure 3.2.
With the primary root file system stored on PCM, Linux has been configured
to make use of this file system by copying its contents directly to SDRAM prior
to using it. One key difference between this and mounting a file system directly
from NAND is that any changes made to the file system are no longer persistent.
In other words, changes made during a Linux session are reflected only until next
system startup since the entire file system state is stored in SDRAM. Beforehand,
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Figure 3.2: PCM and NAND Memory Content Overview - This diagram
shows a sample memory content layout with Linux dependencies stored on the
PCM and secondary file system stored on NAND.
the entire file system was directly mounted from the NAND device, which means
its state is always stored in a non-volatile fashion.
A couple primary advantages are presented by utilizing the images this way.
One of these advantages is simpler and less overhead image validation. This is due
to the fact that primary file system validation does not have to be recalculated,
or tracked every time there is a file system change. If the primary file system was
contained within NAND, all changes to the file system would have to be tracked
in order to validate the file system on a subsequent reboot. This is not only a
more complex validation process, but performing it continuously can induce more
unnecessary overhead in the system.
Another key advantage is that reduced memory footprints for Linux updates
has resulted. More specifically, each of these file systems can now be indepen-
dently updated rather than as a single large file system image. If the primary file
system was stored only on NAND, smaller updates such as single files or direc-
tories could be directly uplinked rather than entire images. This behavior may
seem desirable, but this requires file system changes to be actively tracked on the
system. Unfortunately, this behavior is complex and undesirable.
Overall, software updates for the Linux kernel and primary root file system
consist entirely of new images that can be easily validated with a single checksum.
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However, in order to support validation and use of the secondary file system,
a new process is necessary since any changes to the file system would persist
by default. To validate and update this file system more simply, this default
persistent behavior was removed, and the secondary file system is mounted read-
only on startup. This file system can then be mounted with write capability only
temporarily to apply an update to it. This actually makes validating changes
to the secondary file system much simpler, since each update would only require
changing the file system a single time, rather than continuously tracking file
system changes.
3.4.4 Secondary File System
The secondary file system stored within NAND flash on the system has been de-
signed only to contain extra dependencies rather than those necessary for proper
Linux operation. Additionally, since this file system is stored on NAND flash,
it can support a much larger memory footprint than one contained on PCM.
The primary root file system stored on PCM has an approximate 3MB memory
footprint with this dual file system setup, and the secondary file system has an
approximate 25MB memory footprint.
However, this additional file system requires its own validation and potential
recovery steps because it should not be used by the system if any files happen
to become corrupt. In summary, this validation process is performed prior to
mounting the file system and consists of validating checksums that are stored for
each individual file or directory. When an update is applied to this file system, a
new checksum for the updated file is generated and saved.
Before deciding to validate the file system in this manner, another option was
considered. This option involved using soft-links to refer the entire secondary
file system to another location in NAND, which is also known as a soft-linked
file system. Soft-links are special files in Linux whose data refers to a relative or
absolute path elsewhere on the system [13]. As a result, any changes requested
to the secondary file system would have been reflected elsewhere in a temporary
location rather than at the default paths of the secondary file system. These
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changes would then have to be collected sometime, not necessarily tracked con-
tinuously, and applied to the file system in bulk. This method of validation was
not used since the alternative method of mounting read-only and making single
file system changes was systematically simpler.
The decision to store multiple partitions of this file system on NAND was also
made to support potential recovery and multiple secondary file system versions.
Five partitions of this file system exist with a max size of 32MB to allow for
expanding the secondary file system size. This number of partitions was cho-
sen to support two primary configurations. The first configuration would be two
uniquely versioned, or updatable partitions, each with a recovery partition, and
the second would be four uniquely versioned partitions. The first option allows
for up to two unique secondary file system versions to exist, whereas the second
option allows for four. Each of these options would leave room for a last parti-
tion to act as an ultimate fallback partition that cannot be updated. In order
to recover a partition if it cannot be validated, another partition of the same
version must exist. These are the most likely configurations foreseen that may be
desired for current and future missions. If a circumstance arises where additional
partitions may be needed, support for them could be added with minimal effort.
Initially, each of these file systems is a copy of the other. The only time when
these are not identical is during a software update procedure when one of these
is updated with new files. Thus, the other partitions initially act as a backup in
case unexpected behavior results when attempting to update the currently used
partition.
The rest of the capacity available in NAND is allocated as a general data
partition, and this is always in read-write mode. It exists to contain any desired
set of data, including data gathered from the mission and temporary storage of
software updates as they are uploaded. Since uploading these updates will require
numerous communication links, such a partition is necessary. The amount of
storage available in this partition, roughly 350MB, will also allow for simultaneous
software updates, such as simultaneous root file system and kernel image updates
(i.e., uplinking one before the other is actually complete). This feature may be
useful depending on mission requirements.
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This data partition actually employs Yet Another Flash File System, or
YAFFS2. Due to issues regarding potential NAND memory cell, or block degra-
dation and limited read and write cycles, the decision to use this file system was
made. This data partition will more than likely experience the most amount of
read and write activity while storing mission data and temporary software up-
dates. This file system is designed to efficiently utilize the NAND memory cells
to extend their lifetime, and to handle any degraded block occurrences. More in-
formation regarding this file system can be found in related works Section 6.2.2.
A memory content layout of NAND to reflect these details is presented in
Figure 3.3:
Avionics NAND Memory Layout
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Figure 3.3: Avionics NAND Memory Content - This diagram shows the
actual memory content layout of NAND on the avionics system.
By utilizing the NAND flash in this form, two primary operating modes have
been established. These are known as degraded and non-degraded mode for the
avionics. This NAND device does not actually have to be functional for the
system to properly run given that components for Linux are stored on another
device. Thus, the avionics can tolerate a NAND flash failure while still operating
at a minimal, or degraded level. The non-degraded mode means both the primary
boot device and secondary NAND device are functioning properly.
Fortunately, creating this multiple-image Linux environment was accomplish-
able by slightly tweaking an existing tool. This tool has been used throughout
development of the new avionics, and it has been used to generate the develop-
ment environment and Linux dependencies for this platform.
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3.4.5 Development Environment Overview
The primary tool used to develop for the AT91SAM9G20 and create an envi-
ronment on a host machine for cross-compilation and Linux image generation
is known as buildroot [14]. In short, it supports multiple architectures and it
presents a simple configuration interface for any user to begin embedded Linux
development, such as on the AT91 family of hardware. Much of the dynamic
configuration and build process is handled by a variety of scripts and standard
Makefiles common in a Linux build environment, which were slightly modified
to generate three separate primary Linux images. Buildroot will also generate
a variety of dependencies, such as everything contained in a cross-compilation
toolchain, expected root file system, kernel source, and extended file system for
the desired target. In this case, the desired target is the AT91SAM9G20. Addi-
tionally, the target file systems are easily customizable just by modifying, adding,
or removing any files on the host machine that resemble the final content of these
file systems. These changes are then reflected after simply rebuilding buildroot.
3.5 New Boot Process
To further support this new memory content layout and software update func-
tionality, an updated boot process has been put in place.
3.5.1 U-Boot
On the development unit, AT91 bootstrap’s default behavior acts as a second-
stage in the boot process and loads U-Boot into SDRAM. However, since the
memory footprint of U-Boot and its accompanying environment were unnecessary,
they were removed from the boot process. This was done to free additional
memory in the PCM and to remove the overhead of using a third-stage in the
boot process.
To remove U-Boot, the Linux kernel configuration that was originally sup-
ported by U-Boot needed to be added to the AT91 bootstrap. Fortunately, the
AT91 bootstrap source is provided as freeware by the manufacturer, which allows
for customizing it for the avionics. It’s important to note the limited internal 32K
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SRAM available for the AT91 bootstrap, because if this program size limitation
is exceeded, the bootstrap binary cannot fully execute within the microprocessor.
Fortunately, this limitation did not prevent the necessary additions that would
achieve the desired boot behavior. A bit of guidance available from [15] was
used to support loading Linux, which contains valuable information regarding
necessary steps to boot Linux on ARM architectures.
The AT91 bootstrap sets up the required Linux tags and command-line pa-
rameters for the kernel to startup properly on the avionics. For example, one
of these tags includes specifying whether an initial ram-disk for the kernel is in-
cluded on an external memory device, or as part of the Linux kernel image. Either
option is allowed in Linux, and the former is currently the case for the avionics.
An initial ram-disk is used as a default file system by the kernel during system
startup. This file system is special since it contains dependencies that are neces-
sary for the kernel to start important services and to complete additional system
configuration. This initial ram-disk is used prior to mounting the actual primary
root file system. In the case of the avionics, the initial ram-disk is identical to the
primary root file-system image, so a separate initial ram-disk is not necessary to
store on the PCM. This is a completely valid configuration for Linux, although
it is not common to have identical initial ram-disk and root file system images.
3.5.2 PCM Support
To support interfacing with the PCM device on startup, additions to the AT91
bootstrap were necessary. Since a standard SPI interface driver already existed
within the AT91 bootstrap for Dataflash R©, adding support for the PCM was not
difficult. The only requirements were to add a specific command-set to support
the PCM, such as for reading and writing from and to the PCM device.
The internal first-stage bootstrap stored within the AT91SAM9G20 needed
to be compatible with the PCM at a minimal level. This is due to the fact that
the second-stage AT91 bootstrap is stored in the PCM and must be read by the
first-stage. Since the first-stage bootstrap cannot be changed because it’s located
on an internal ROM, the basic read functionality performed by the first-stage
needed to be compatible with the PCM device command-set. Fortunately, basic
33
3. NEW AVIONICS PLATFORM ARCHITECTURE
read operations with SPI-based flash devices are common, including those of the
PCM, so the necessary compatibility existed.
3.5.3 Validation
A major subsystem of the software update architecture is the validation process.
This exists in two forms, one of which is Linux system image validation, and
the other, secondary file system validation. To facilitate updating either of these
components, validation is performed at different steps during the startup process.
First, validation of system images occurs while initially booting using a robust
checksum algorithm and computing a checksum on each image during the boot-
strap phase. By doing this at startup, system image updates can also be easily
validated since they are copied to the same primary boot device before being
used by the system. Performing validation at startup will detect invalid images
on the PCM and prevent the system from potentially booting using invalid im-
ages. This event could be caused by invalid read operations from the PCM or a
corrupt image being saved to the PCM. Although all updates transferred to the
avionics will be verified, transient memory corruption can occur while applying
any update from temporary NAND storage.
Fortunately, a low overhead and reliable algorithm was chosen to achieve vali-
dation, which is the MD5 cryptographic hash. This generates a 128-bit checksum
regardless of the input data size and produces drastically different results with
even a single bit difference. To employ this checksum, the bootstrap was cus-
tomized to compute checksums on each of the Linux images before loading them
into SDRAM. These checksums, image sizes, and memory offsets are compiled
as part of the bootstrap each time a new set of images is programmed into the
PCM.
Secondly, a validation process for the secondary file system was designed that
would be executed after Linux starts. This process would run prior to mounting
the secondary file system from NAND. As previously mentioned, two solutions
were considered that would perform with low-overhead. The final solution that
was simpler and reliable maintains an MD5 checksum for each individual file and
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directory within the file system. It scans the file system hierarchy recursively en-
suring each file is valid by computing its corresponding checksum and comparing.
This file system is mounted read-only such that unanticipated changes do not
occur without updating any checksums for the requested file system change. To
apply new updates to this file system after they are uplinked, a checksum for the
corresponding change is calculated and the file system is remounted read-write
to apply the change. After applying and validating the update, the file system
is again remounted as read-only to prevent any further changes. If any of these
steps happen to fail and recovery is necessary, other copies of the partition are
used to attempt to recover any damaged or missing files.
A flow diagram showing the overall behavior of this boot process can be seen
in Figure 3.4.
Copy Linux 
Kernel to 
SDRAM and 
Begin Execution
Load Root File 
System and 
Continue Startup
Validate and 
Mount 
Secondary File 
System from 
NANDValidate Linux 
Kernel and Root 
File System 
Images
AT91 
Bootstrap
Startup
Figure 3.4: Avionics Boot Process Overview - This diagram illustrates an
overview of the avionics boot process, including validation of Linux images and
secondary file system.
3.6 System State Logging
Another major subsystem designed to support software update functionality is
an overall system state storing mechanism. This state would be contained as
a set of simple messages to facilitate things such as software update application
requests, or boot attempt failure and success messages. In order to recover from a
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potential boot failure, having knowledge such as the number of boot attempts and
successes is critical recovery info. To essentially unapply a software update, the
system must be aware that the update is non-functional. This could be discerned
simply by knowing how many times the system was able to boot or not boot
successfully using an update. Additionally, with this information stored as a set
of messages, it would be simple to request a software update to be applied to the
system, since this could be done by logging a single message.
This system state information exists in the form of a statically sized log stored
in PCM. A linked-list data structure is employed in the implementation of the
log to enable memory wrap-around support and cleanup of old message entries.
Logs on many systems act similarly by wrapping in memory after reaching max
capacity. Without performing this way, the log would have to stop collecting
data until it could be cleaned by the system, and this behavior is typically not
desirable.
Access to this state information would need to be available from different parts
of the system, such as the bootstrap and Linux OS. Since it is stored in PCM,
it can already be accessed by the bootstrap. However, support for this device
did not already exist within the Linux kernel, but it was entirely feasible to add.
The existing SPI device kernel driver was modified similarly to the bootstrap to
support the PCM command-set. After performing the necessary modifications,
the PCM could be accessed from user-space in Linux.
3.6.1 Multiple Image Support
To ultimately upload software image updates and store them in the PCM, func-
tionality to store multiple copies of Linux images was employed. Otherwise, only
a single image set (i.e., kernel and root file system) can be used at a time and
an updated image set must replace the original set. This approach can be fatal
to the system if an original working image set is potentially replaced with an
inoperable one. This would also allow for the system to recover and fallback to a
preexisting image set if a new set of images cannot be used.
Currently, there are two sets of kernel and root file system images, which are
initially copies of each other until a software update replaces one of these sets.
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Backup images are only used in the event of failure, or exceeding a max number
of boot attempts with a specific set of images. By default, one initial kernel and
root file system set is always made available for recovery, and it is not allowed to
be modified. This ensures that there is always a known working set of images for
recovery.
Since the PCM has a max capacity of 16 MB data storage, all of it is utilized
effectively to leave storage for future software updates and to have backup Linux
images available in case recovery is needed. Two copies of the system state log,
which are initially identical to one other, are also stored in PCM in case the data
in one happens to become corrupt due to unexpected upsets. These two logs are
designed to contain the exact same sets of data and thus, they are resynchronized
if any desynchronization is detected.
Figure 3.5 shows the final content memory layout of the PCM on the avionics.
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Figure 3.5: Avionics PCM Content - This shows the typical content organi-
zation of each item contained within the PCM device.
Intentional gaps of memory have been placed between each image, log, or
bootstrap pieces in the PCM. This was done to reduce the likelihood of over-
lapping these components when perhaps a software image update is written. If
this event were to occur, the overwritten data would not be usable. This extra
precaution is simple and could prevent a major error from occurring, which may
not even be recoverable.
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3.7 Software Updates
Overall, individual steps of the validation and recovery process have been de-
scribed. To fully perform a system update, it must be remotely transferred to
NAND and then copied to its corresponding destination. Potential solutions for
remote transfer are discussed, as well as the final validation process.
3.7.1 Remote Transfer
Supporting reliable software update transfer via RF involves several features.
The majority of these include verification of individual data packets as they are
sent and received between the spacecraft and ground. Additionally, these packets
may be received out of order, lost or dropped and need to be re-requested, and
eventually, they all must be merged into a single update file. Fortunately, utilizing
Linux on the avionics provides preexisting solutions to handle this. These include
standard network data transfer utilities that have been developed and tested by
several other users, such as a standard file-transfer protocol, or ftp [16, 17, 18].
These solutions are inherently more reliable and robust than one that could be
developed as part of this thesis.
Ftp achieves reliable data transfer by employing a standard networking pro-
tocol known as transmission control protocol, or TCP [19]. Although this incurs
additional overhead for a satellite link, it does suffice as data transfer solution.
A custom ftp utility is currently being developed by another PolySat student to
improve data transfer performance for the link between the avionics system and
the ground. This will eventually be used in place of standard ftp. Other utilities
such as scp [20] can be used, which essentially uses the same protocol as ftp but
instead with an encrypted and secure data connection.
Typical communication data rates on past PolySat missions have ranged from
1200 to 9600 baud. Although baud rate is actually the signal modulation rate
for a digitally modulated transmission, the effective data rate is approximately
the same given the encodings usually used for communication (e.g., non-return-
to-zero, or NRZ). An estimated time for remote transfer of a 1.5MB software
update at 9600 bits per second with protocol overhead, including packet loss and
packet latency, would be roughly seven to ten days. This highly depends on other
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factors of the communication link not considered here, such as ground station
elements and orbit, but this is a reasonable estimate derived from communication
experience on past satellites.
This estimation also assumes only a single ground station is available to
remotely transfer a software update, which may not be the case. Several so-
lutions are independently or collaboratively being developed to network addi-
tional ground stations across the globe to support satellite operations, such as
GENSO [21]. These solutions may be widely used in the near future, which would
effectively increase the overall communication link time for satellites. The result-
ing advantage is that software updates or other data could be transferred more
quickly, which may be critical to mission success depending on the nature of the
update.
3.7.2 Final Validation
The last major subsystem for software update functionality is final validation
and application of the software update to the system. Final validation must be
performed prior to and after transferring the completed update or unintended
upsets may be introduced into the system. The primary cause of such an upset
would be transient memory corruption, and thus, the data may not be written
correctly to its destination or even to temporary storage.
To help prevent such an upset, the software update’s MD5 checksum is trans-
ferred to the avionics prior to actually updating the system. This MD5 can be
used in comparison with the transferred data and decide whether to proceed with
applying it to the system. After receiving and validating this final checksum, the
software update is either copied to PCM if it’s intended to be a Linux update, or
copied to the secondary file system if intended to be a file update. Lastly, a boot
request message is placed in the system state logs so the bootstrap may load the
proper image from PCM on subsequent startup.
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3.8 System Limitations
Although the overall system supports all desired functionality, a few primary lim-
itations of the software update architecture exist that should be briefly addressed.
Multiple images are supported by the software update architecture, but only
one additional set. If storing more than one update for Linux was desired so they
can both be readily available and used, this is currently not possible. Depending
on the mission requirements, this may or may not be an ideal configuration.
This is simply a limitation of the PCM capacity, and it would not be difficult
to support additional sets of images in PCM with a larger capacity device. An
undesirable solution to this problem could be to store multiple image updates on
NAND flash and continue to apply them to the PCM when desired. However,
this would require writing a new set of images each time to the PCM to reflect
a new update, and this could increase the likelihood for data corruption on the
device.
Secondly, there are multiple copies of each critical component contained in
the PCM except for the AT91 bootstrap. Unfortunately, this is a limitation of
the internal first-stage bootstrap, which is hardcoded to search for a valid second-
stage bootstrap from physical address zero on all external memory devices. This
is why the second-stage bootstrap starts at address zero in the PCM, but also the
reason why a copy cannot be stored directly after it. If a copy of this bootstrap
was located directly after the original, it would not be usable and could not be
detected by the first-stage bootstrap.
The worst-case failure that could occur from this is corruption of the boot-
strap, thus preventing the system from ever properly booting. One potential so-
lution considered was to contain a copy of this second-stage bootstrap on NAND
flash. Since the first-stage internal bootstrap scans multiple external memory
devices at startup, the thought was that a corrupt bootstrap in PCM would be
skipped and the copy on NAND flash could be used. However, this is not the case,
since the first-stage internal bootstrap will still attempt to use the one provided
in PCM if any remnants of it exist. To actually remove all data associated with
the second-stage bootstrap, it needs to be completely removed from PCM with a
sequence of erase commands. The resulting corrupted or damaged second-stage
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bootstrap due to a radiation upset or overlapping memory write would most likely
not resemble that of a second stage that’s been completely erased (i.e., remnants
of it will most likely always exist after corruption).
Because the PCM is inherently robust against radiation induced upsets, per-
manent corruption of the bootstrap is unlikely to occur from radiation. However,
this does not prevent another subsystem from accidentally overwriting its con-
tents. A solution to this potential scenario is to utilize the memory-protect feature
available in the PCM device. This feature allows for any region of memory to be
write protected if commanded, and thus, any accidental writes that would result
in overwriting the bootstrap could be prevented. An implementation to support
write-protecting this memory space has not yet been developed but could be an
extension to this thesis.
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4Major Subsystems
The three major systems that play key roles for overall software update func-
tionality are described in further detail. The overall design and independent
verification for each subsystem are presented. The design decisions, implemen-
tation, and testing details regarding these subsystems were a major part of the
work that encompasses this thesis.
4.1 System State Log
4.1.1 Overview
The system state log is a major subsystem utilized on the avionics, which is de-
signed to support validation and recovery of critical system components. This
mainly includes the Linux kernel and root file system images, but it also en-
compasses maintaining an overall boot state for the system. This system boot
knowledge is necessary in order to decide when recovery of the system is nec-
essary, and to request application of Linux image updates. To support system
image validation, this log must also store other important Linux image and sec-
ondary file system data, such as image lengths and associated MD5s in order to
validate and load images at startup.
This subsystem acts as a message-passing log that is contained within the
PCM and has a static size of 128KB. More information regarding common log
structures and protocols is presented in related works section 6.3. There are two
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copies of the system state log, where one should be used in case the other happens
to reflect an invalid state or contains improper data. Data is stored in the log
in the form of separate entries or messages. These entries are designed to be
collected in subsequent or appending fashion and removed or cleaned when no
longer needed by the system.
4.1.2 Requirements
There are a few primary requirements regarding information that the system state
log should maintain, and how it should be used.
In order for the avionics system to recover from potential error, some type
of information to discern when the system should recover is necessary. In other
words, the system may fail to boot by attempting to use a corrupt Linux image,
or by encountering an unexpected reset prior to full startup. However, unless
these failed boot attempts are tracked and acknowledged by the system, recovery
from these scenarios are not possible. Storing this critical information in a reliable
device such as the PCM makes the most sense, and by doing this, these logged
messages can be viewed at the bootstrap or Linux OS level.
To allow for software updates to be applied to the avionics, some type of
message or request to apply an update is necessary. Since all system updates
must be applied on subsequent reboot of the system, the system state log should
handle supporting this type of request. This would enable functionality for a
desired update to be used on a subsequent system startup.
Lastly, the system state log should support storing a series of subsequent or
chained messages that can be simply appended or removed when desired. This
structure allows for messages to simply be scanned, added, or removed from the
log as necessary. If the data was perhaps organized such that specific sections
of memory were designated for storing only certain message types, the process
to scan, add, and remove entries would be less flexible. With a standard log
structure, any log entry type can precede the next and vice versa.
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4.1.3 Design
Four types of message or log entry types have been designed for the log to support
its desired functionality. The first is a boot attempt message, which simply
denotes an attempt to boot using a specific set of Linux images and a secondary
file system. This message type allows the system to determine when recovery is
needed by simply counting boot attempts and checking whether the max number
of attempts for a specific image version has been exceeded. The max number of
boots attempts allowed per Linux image or secondary file system is five. Multiple
versions of these system images can exist, and thus, the versions of each image
used are marked accordingly in a boot attempt.
The second entry type is a boot status message, which is used to signify a
successful boot for a specific Linux image or secondary file system. This boot
status signifies that one of these components successfully loaded during startup.
This boot message does not signify that all three components necessary for startup
were successful, as the system could not discern the proper boot state if this
were the case. In other words, the boot status success message must represent
independent successful startup for each image type in order to determine which
image or secondary file system may be corrupt or unusable. When either of these
Linux components is successfully loaded, a boot status success message is placed
in the log with the component’s corresponding version number.
The third entry type is a file table entry, which is designed to contain in-
formation to support different versions of the Linux images and secondary root
file system for software updates. Without these, software updates would not be
possible. There are three file table entry types, which are Linux kernel, root file
system, and secondary file system tables. Each table contains specific informa-
tion for one of these dependencies, such as MD5, memory address in PCM, and
so on to support multiple versions. Each file table can support information for
up to seven versions of a Linux image or secondary file system. These tables are
updated during a software update to reflect the new contents in memory, such as
the content in PCM after a software update is applied.
The last entry type is a boot request, which is used to request that the system
load a specific Linux image set and secondary file system on subsequent startup.
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Since there are version numbers associated with each image and secondary file
system partition, these are specified in a boot request. The bootstrap scans this
boot request on the next system startup and responds by attempting to startup
using the requested images. An overview of these entry types and their contents
is shown below in Figure 4.1.
The boot request entry is very similar to a boot attempt, except that asso-
ciated file table information regarding each image is not specified. This is not
necessary since the bootstrap will just attempt to use the first encountered image
descriptions from each file table that match the desired versions in a boot request
entry. However, in a boot attempt, since the same version of multiple images can
exist, specific information contained in the file table for the image used during
startup must be noted.
The file table entries mostly contain information regarding the Linux kernel
and root file system images, but only some of these fields are leveraged for the
secondary file system partitions. Fields not specifically utilized in a secondary
file system table are the MD5 and length fields, since one specific MD5 cannot
apply to an entire secondary file system, and storing its static partition size or
length is not necessary because it’s already known. Compatibility modes for each
image and secondary file system are also defined to ensure incompatible image
combinations are not used on startup. These modes exist as a set of three (one
for the Linux kernel, one of the root file system, and one for the secondary file
system) minimum version numbers that are compatible with a specific image. For
example, a kernel image can have a minimum version of the root file system and
a minimum version of the secondary file system with which it’s compatible.
A log entry has a general form that can be designated as one of these specific
entries when needed. Each log entry is the same size, 256 bytes, which allows
for up to 512 entries to exist per log. This size was chosen to accommodate the
largest entry type and some margin in case extra fields are added in the future.
The general form of a log entry is shown below in Figure 4.2.
The entry contents depend on the type of entry, whose specific fields are
described in Figure 4.1. The entry MD5 is used to validate each entry prior to
being used by the bootstrap. The sequence number for each entry acts as an
entry counter for all entries contained in the log, which is incremented for each
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Figure 4.1: Log Entry Types - This figure overviews each log entry type and
their associated fields.
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Figure 4.2: General Log Entry - This figure shows a single general log entry,
and additional fields and sizes that are included in every entry.
new entry appended. New entries are only added to the end of the log, and the
end is identified based on the max sequence number that exists in the log. Since
the entries are organized by ascending sequence number, it’s easy to determine
the starting and ending entries for each log.
The log entries do not actually have to begin at the memory address starting
point for each log, and they do not have to end at the designated memory address
stopping point (i.e., the log memory bounds in PCM). When the log entries are
scanned, a linked-list data structure is used to support this organization. Thus,
the head of the entry list is wherever the lowest sequence number entry is located
in memory. The tail is located wherever the highest sequence number entry is
located in memory. This allows the log structure to wrap in memory such as
a wrap-around buffer if needed. Two sample log structures representing two
distinct possible entry organizations are shown in Figure 4.3.
4.1.4 Bootstrap Usage
In order to support using software image updates and validating them on startup,
the AT91 bootstrap was further customized to scan each log for the current boot
state. If any images or secondary file systems have attempted to boot and failed
at least five times, the corresponding component is no longer considered valid.
Thus, it is skipped until a corresponding boot status success message is placed
into the log sometime in the future.
If a boot request message is encountered while scanning these logs, the re-
quested Linux image and secondary file system versions are loaded during startup.
48
4.1 System State Log
....
....
Sample Log Structure 1
Log Entry
1
Log Entry
2
Log Entry
3
Log Entry
4
Head Tail
Memory
Address Start
Memory
Address End
Sample Log Structure 2
Log Entry
3
Log Entry
4
Log Entry
1
Log Entry
2
HeadTailMemory
Address Start
Memory
Address End
Figure 4.3: Two Possible Log Structures - This figure demonstrates two
possible log structures that may exist using a linked-list data structure.
A boot attempt is written to the log as the last step prior to loading the kernel
image.
Since multiple versions of the same log entry may exist, the bootstrap only
utilizes the latest version of each log entry type. The latest versions will reflect
the most current system state, and the latest version of a specific log entry is
identified by the highest sequence number among a given set of entries of that
specific type. However, all boot attempt entries are considered during startup
since these are counted to ensure the number of boot attempts for a specific
image set and secondary file system has not been exceeded. An overall flow
diagram representing the startup behavior using these system state logs is shown
in Figure 4.4.
The compatibility modes defined for each Linux image and secondary file
system must be recognized, as any boot request should specify versions that are
compatible. If this is not the case, the bootstrap will continue to iterate through
each file table until a valid combination of these main components can be used.
This new combination is chosen to resemble, by version number, the originally
requested image set as much as possible (i.e., by starting at the requested version
numbers and decrementing).
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Figure 4.4: Startup Behavior using System State Logs - This flow diagram
illustrates the startup behavior of the AT91 bootstrap while utilizing the system
state logs.
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4.1.5 Linux Usage
The system state logs are also used at the Linux level. More specifically, this is
done with a user-space process to write boot status success messages, and to clean
the log. Although the default SPI driver within the Linux kernel did not support
the PCM, it was modified to include support for the PCM’s command-set.
At startup, two boot status success entries are written for the current kernel
and root file system images to signify their proper startup. These should actu-
ally be done independently rather than in unison, which is currently the case.
However, kernel space support for writing a corresponding boot status success
message would need to be added, and this development should be an extension
to this thesis.
After writing the necessary boot status messages, the log is cleaned to re-
move any unnecessary entries that are no longer needed. The only entries that
need to be preserved in the log are the latest versions of each entry type. For
example, if multiple boot attempts were made for a specific set of Linux images,
only the latest boot attempt entry needs to be preserved after the system fully
boots. Additionally, if either log happens to become desynchronized from the
other due to a system upset or invalid write command to the PCM, they need to
be resynchronized. This resynchronization process, if needed, is also performed
while cleaning the logs.
A user-space process was written to perform this cleaning as a final step at
startup. In short, the process obtains the latest state from both system logs.
Then, it deletes any entries that are no longer needed based on their respective
sequence numbers (i.e., only entries with the highest sequence number for each
type are preserved). This procedure is performed for both logs.
One thing to consider while cleaning is fragmentation of the logs. This means
log entries should not be erased such that the resulting log has unused sections
of memory between the head and tail entries. This is similar to fragmentation of
a hard disk drive in a desktop machine that may occur from frequently deleting
and writing new files. A fragmented log would result in inefficient storing of log
entries, since it’s structured to always append new entries. Thus, unused memory
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for new entries would exist within the log itself rather than only after the tail
entry.
The cleaning process is designed to detect any fragmentation that would result
before cleaning any entries. If fragmentation would result from cleaning the log,
all entries that should be preserved are copied to the end of the log before any
entries marked for deletion are actually erased. After copying any necessary
entries to the end, the entries marked for deletion are erased. An overall flow
diagram representing the cleaning process is shown in Figure 4.5.
If the logs are not synchronized, the entries to preserve are copied to the
end of the log prior to cleaning regardless of any detected fragmentation. The
entries marked for preservation are the latest versions of each type of entry from
both logs (i.e., the union of all entries from both logs). This is a simpler repair
scheme than attempting to determine which specific entries are desynchronized
from either log and then attempting to repair the entries individually.
4.1.6 Design Success
Overall, the system state logs and associated subprocesses such as the cleaner
have been implemented to function with desired behavior.
A critical feature of the logs is enabling system recovery if it’s necessary to
perform at system startup. By maintaining an overall system boot state, this
desired behavior is achieved. The boot attempts can be used to determine when
a set of Linux images or secondary file system are not behaving properly and
thus, a different version of each component can be used instead.
The other critical feature allows for application of software updates, which
necessitates two distinct log entries. First, an associated file table is updated
to provide necessary information for booting with a specific Linux image or sec-
ondary file system. Next, a boot request entry is written to request that the
AT91 bootstrap attempt to load the desired versions of the Linux components
and secondary file system on subsequent startup.
Lastly, the structure of the log is maintained as a series of subsequent entries
that are ultimately appended to one another. This has resulted in the flexibility
to scan, append, and clean the logs in a simple fashion.
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Figure 4.5: Log Cleaning Process Flow Diagram - This diagram shows the
behavior of the cleaning process that’s executed at system startup.
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To test these primary log features, various small test cases were first conducted
followed by tests that encompass functionality of all of these elements. The latter
test cases are discussed. Recovery from using a requested image set on the system
was conducted by manually rebooting multiple times until the max number of
boot attempts was exceeded. On final startup, the bootstrap considered these
images invalid and ultimately loaded fallback images. The logs were then cleaned
and boot success messages were placed into the log to signify successful startup.
On subsequent startup, the original images were once again considered valid and
properly loaded.
The majority of testing for applying software updates was completed with the
final validation and application process, which is detailed as the last subsystem
in this chapter. However, to initially test functionality for file table entries and
boot requests, a small utility was used to manipulate boot request and file table
entries to ultimately request different boot combinations. Tests such as compati-
bility detection between various image sets and versions, and the ability to store
multiple versions within file table entries were conducted.
Lastly, the cleaning process was tested for basic cleaning cases, and also tested
to verify that system state log corruption would not result from unexpected resets
while cleaning. If an entry is copied or erased during an intermittent reset, this
entry will most likely be corrupt on subsequent startup. In such a case, the
corrupt entry was either meant to be deleted, or it’s a copy of another, so the
system state is actually unaffected. The cleaning procedure is conducted in a
way such that the overall system state is not lost while the procedure takes place,
whether or not a reset occurs.
A summary of these tests and their results are provided in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: State Log Tests and Results
Primary Test Result
File table and boot request compatibility Proper system startup
Multiversion data stored in file tables Verified using debug output
Recovery from boot request image use Recovered with fallback images
Desynchronized and fragmented cleaning Proper cleanup of logs
Upset tolerance while cleaning Successful log cleanup on next startup
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4.2 Secondary File System
4.2.1 Overview
The secondary file system is used to contain non-critical components that are
not required for full Linux operation. Its main purpose is to store all convenient
Linux dependencies that are not necessary to store within the primary root file
system. This both decreases the software image update footprint for the primary
root file system, and also results in a simpler validation process for the Linux
images.
This file system is stored entirely on NAND and exists as five separate par-
titions that may be used for performing software updates and recovery. Only
four of these partitions may be updated to a newer version, which results in an
updated file hierarchy. One partition is not modifiable so that it can be used as
a fallback partition in case additional recovery is necessary. Recovery of the file
system is only possible if a second partition of the same version exists, since the
file system hierarchy state between the two need to be identical. If such a version
does not exist for recovery or recovery with a specific partition fails, the fallback
partition is ultimately mounted for use.
To use this file system reliably, a validation and recovery procedure was de-
veloped in the form of a Linux user-space process. This process runs after Linux
startup and attempts to validate the secondary file system by comparing individ-
ually stored MD5 checksums for each file. This is done prior to initially mounting
the file system so whether it’s the default secondary file system or an updated
one, they’re always validated. If recovery is necessary due to a detected invalid
file, a partition of the same version is also mounted and the corresponding file is
copied for repair. If no recovery partition is available or the recovery fails, the
fallback partition is mounted.
4.2.2 Requirements
In order to reliably use this file system and any updates applied to it, it should be
validated and a recovery mechanism needs to exist. These are the two primary
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requirements for this process, which are necessary to prevent the use of invalid
updates and to recover if such an event does occur.
This process is required to use standard file system calls and services available
from Linux in order to perform efficient validation and recovery of these files.
This will also ensure that this process can be used in other Linux distributions if
necessary, as well as future missions. Other standard system utilities should be
used and executed for the recovery procedure, such as rsync to copy files between
partitions, rather than manually copying file contents during recovery. These
preexisting Linux utilities are more reliable and efficient for performing simple
operations and should be used when possible.
This process should support all necessary Linux file types that may exist in
the secondary file system. Currently, only regular files, directories, and symbolic
links exist within this file system. These are the only file types supported by the
validation and recovery process, although support for others in the future may
be added.
4.2.3 Design
To prevent continuously tracking file system changes for validation, the secondary
file system is mounted read-only so that it cannot be dynamically modified. If
the partition was mounted read-write, a process or service would always need
to be executing to detect any file system changes and to constantly recalculate
validation or checksum data for the files. A simpler solution is to perform these
steps on a specific partition only when a request to update that file system is
made.
During a file system update, the secondary file system to be updated is
mounted read-write to apply the desired update. Updates cannot be applied to
the currently used partition since it may be in use by a Linux process or service.
The current secondary file system is only ever mounted read-write during a re-
covery procedure, which would occur at initial Linux startup. After any recovery
procedure is performed, the secondary file system is remounted read-only.
To validate the file system prior to mounting it at startup, an MD5 checksum
is calculated for each file and compared to a known MD5 for the file. If the MD5
56
4.2 Secondary File System
checksums do not match, recovery is attempted for this specific file. The MD5s
of the entire file system hierarchy are pre-calculated using another utility that’s
executed on the entire file system prior to it being flashed to NAND.
For regular files, the corresponding MD5 checksums are calculated on the file’s
contents. For symbolic links, the MD5 checksum is calculated on the file path
referenced by the link. This does not ensure that the link is not dangling or lost,
which means the destination file being referenced by the link does not actually
exist. However, the file that the link references will also be validated, and any
dangling links will be detected and repaired.
Lastly, directories are unique and usually contain references to several other
files contained within the directory. This is also known as a content or entry
listing. For example, the data for a directory will contain a listing of files that it
references, including path and other attributes of each file. A sample directory
referencing three files is shown in Figure 4.6.
/bin
reg_file_1
link_1
dir_1
Sample Directory
Figure 4.6: Sample Directory - This diagram shows a single directory structure
with three file entries that would be contained in its directory listing.
To ensure the listing of a directory is valid on the file system, a simple check-
sum cannot be used. Instead, a listing file that contains the proper listing contents
for each directory must be saved within the file system for validation. These di-
rectory listings are stored as hidden files in the same file system. Although only
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the paths and modes for each file need to be contained within a listing to vali-
date a directory, MD5s for each file within the directory are also recorded. This
prevents the need to use another mechanism for storing the MD5 information
for regular files and soft links. This information is ultimately needed to validate
these files.
To support multiple versions of the secondary file system, the current version
of each partition is contained in a file table log entry. This file table entry is
parsed to identify other partitions that may have the same version that can be
used for recovery.
Lastly, to maintain the overall state of the system, a boot success entry is
saved to both system state logs once a secondary file system is mounted. This
is done by the validation and recovery process as a last step prior to completing
execution.
4.2.4 Directory Listings
A few more details regarding directory listings should be addressed, since these
contain all critical validation information for the secondary file system.
Validation of any directory listing file must be performed before using the MD5
information stored within the actual listing. To solve this problem, a directory’s
corresponding listing is stored one directory above its designated directory, and
an MD5 for this file is also maintained. The directory listings for the root or ‘top’
directories of the file system hierarchy are actually stored in the primary root file
system image. A sample structure of these files for a couple directories is shown
in Figure 4.7.
Each directory listing name is prefixed with .listing. followed by its associated
directory name. For example, the listing .listing.bin refers to a directory listing for
the directory bin. The directory listing and its associated directory are assumed
to exist in the same directory. In the given example, two directory listings are
presented, one which contains information for the entries contained in /bin, and
the second which contains information the entries contained in /bin/dir 1.
The necessary data to store in the listing to validate a directory includes any
file names referenced by the directory, and their modes. A mode of a file on
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/bin
reg_file_1
link_1
dir_1
Sample Directory Structure with Directory Listings
/.listing.bin
.listing.dir_1
Figure 4.7: Sample Directory with Listings - This diagram shows a simple
directory structure with listing files that would contain directory listing contents.
most Linux file systems consists of a permission state that defines who can and
cannot access the file. In addition, the actual directory mode corresponding to a
directory listing should also be saved within the listing. To further make use of
this directory listing file, MD5s for regular files and soft-links are stored for their
validation.
The original solution to this problem was to preserve the directory listing and
associated MD5s for regular files and soft-links as separate entities. However,
using a single file to contain both sets of information is a simpler solution and
does not have any drawbacks from the original solution.
The mode for the directory is the first set of data in the listing file, but all
data following is associated with the entries contained within the directory. This
information is semicolon delimited and consists of three main parts. The first part
is the file’s mode, followed by the file name, and lastly its MD5. Any information
regarding a subdirectory entry would be contained in its associated listing file,
which should exist in the same directory. A directory listing sample that contains
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data for two general file entries is shown in Figure 4.8.
Sample Directory Listing Contents
....Directory'sMode
Next Entry
Mode
Entry File 
Name
Entry 
MD5
44 Varies 16
Next Entry
Mode
4
Figure 4.8: Sample Directory Listing File Contents - This diagram illus-
trates the content structure within the directory listing file. The size in bytes for
each field is also shown.
Each of these fields is semicolon delimited to simplify parsing. One initial
concern was the file system naming allowed for JFFS2, since the directory listings
depend on a delimiter. JFFS2 in fact does not allow semicolons in its file names,
although it may be allowed on other standard Linux file systems. Additionally,
a static field size of 16 bytes is always assumed for the MD5 so that parsing it
does not depend on the delimiter.
To validate the file system, a recursive tree traversal is executed starting
at the root of the secondary file system. Before traversing any subdirectories,
their associated directory listings are scanned and validated by comparing each
file’s mode, name, and MD5 for correctness. This process is repeated until all
directories within the secondary file system have been traversed.
4.2.5 Error Conditions
If any errors are encountered during traversal of the secondary file system, re-
covery is attempted if possible. However, some errors are not recoverable, such
as some encountered from Linux file system calls being used by the validation
process. During traversal of the directory tree, an overall error state is kept to
use for future recovery.
Errors for which recovery is necessary include invalid comparison between any
file mode, name, or associated MD5 for a file. If one or more of these fields do
not match, the file is flagged for recovery. If either of these errors occurs on a
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regular file or soft-link, it can simply be copied from another partition of the same
version for recovery.
A special case is presented when an error condition is detected on a directory
listing. In this event, the associated directory contents are not scanned until the
listing is recovered. If perhaps any of these errors occurs on an entire directory, an
attempt to copy the entire directory contents from a recovery partition is made.
Prior to copying any of these files for recovery from a recovery partition,
they are validated on their corresponding file system. These files are actually
copied between partitions using a standard Linux utility known as rsync, which
is designed to preserve the file’s mode and timestamps when copied. Once all
flagged files are recovered, they are again validated on the current partition. If
after recovery the file system is still invalid, another attempt at recovery is made
using the next available recovery partition. This process is repeated until all
available recovery partitions are exhausted. If full recovery is not achieved, the
fallback secondary file system partition is ultimately mounted.
Lastly, if an unexpected system reset occurs during any of these procedures,
validation and recovery would resume on subsequent system startup. If a reset
occurs prior to the full validation of a secondary file system, an attempt to validate
it again on reboot will be made. This validation process is executed every time
Linux starts until a secondary file system can be properly mounted. If a reset
occurs during the recovery process, an additional recovery attempt is performed
on next startup, regardless of whether the past recovery attempt completed.
An overall flow diagram illustrating the behavior of the validation and recovery
process is shown in Figure 4.9.
4.2.6 Design Success
This process has been successfully implemented and tested to meet the desired
requirements. Although a variety of test cases were conducted for validation,
much of the testing process is similar, and this is summarized.
The primary requirements to validate and recover the secondary file system
have been met by first testing functionality for each individually, and then to-
gether. The Linux process was executed and its recovery state was output for a
61
4. MAJOR SUBSYSTEMS
Scan Initial 
Directory Listing 
Invalid Entry 
Detected
Validate 
Associated 
Directory
Yes
Flag for Recovery
No
Continue 
Directory 
Validation
Scan Next 
Subdirectory 
Listing
Validate Next 
Subdirectory
All Entries
Validated
No
Yes
Figure 4.9: Validation and Recovery Process Overview - This flow diagram
shows the overall behavior and primary subtasks of the validation and recovery
process.
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small file system hierarchy to verify invalid files were not detected. This same
test was then conducted on a much larger file hierarchy that would actually rep-
resent the secondary file system, and eventually conducted on the secondary file
system itself. In these cases, the file systems were properly validated but recover
attempts were not made.
Initially, a few cases not considered were discovered during testing, and the
process was remedied to account for these issues. These include multiple soft-link
file dependencies, such as a link that points further down into the file system, or
links that depend on other links in the system.
To verify the recovery scheme would actually recover, an invalid file was inten-
tionally placed into the file system and valid recovery partitions were defined. The
Linux process was run to attempt to replace the file from an available recovery
partition. When complete, the originally invalid file was able to be revalidated,
even after reboot. Lastly, recovery partitions were made unavailable when needed
for recovery. As a result, the system would ultimately mount the fallback parti-
tion as expected.
An overview of the primary test cases and their results are presented in Ta-
ble 4.2.
Table 4.2: Validation and Recovery Tests and Results
Primary Test Result
Validate 10-15 entry size file system Properly validated
Validate 800-900 entry size file system Properly validated
Recover single file Recovered and revalidated
Recover multiple files Recovered and revalidated
Recovery partition unavailable Fallback partition mounted
This process was implemented using a variety of standard I/O system calls
available within Linux and additional libraries. Because of this, the validation
portion of the process may be run on another host machine architecture if desired,
but with a couple minor tweaks (e.g., default starting path for file system to
validate may be different on another machine).
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To meet the final requirement, all potential file types that may be encountered
in the secondary file system are fully supported by this process. This currently
includes directories, soft-links, and regular files.
4.3 Final Update Application
4.3.1 Overview
Before any updates are applied to the system, a final validation process is exe-
cuted. This simply validates the full update file prior to copying it to its des-
tination memory device. Only three update types are possible: kernel image,
root file system image, or secondary file system updates. The validation and
update application steps are performed using a process that is always executing
on the system. The final validation and software update application sequence
begins when the process is commanded remotely via RF. In order to support
receiving and transmitting commands remotely, this application was integrated
with a preexisting software architecture that was designed by Greg Manyak and
implemented by several past students.
4.3.2 Requirements
The final validation process is rather simple and only a couple primary require-
ments exist. First, this process must be able to receive a valid command from the
avionics RF system. The data contained with this command should consist of a
file path referring to a software update file to apply, its type, a version number,
an offset number, and MD5 of the update file. The secondary file system is only
limited to applying updates one file at a time, and thus, must be commanded
for each subsequent update desired. Additionally, a command to update the sec-
ondary file system must include a destination path to signify where to apply the
update, since this can be applied anywhere in the file system.
The second requirement states that this recovery process must update the
system state logs, or directory listings to reflect any applied updates. This in-
cludes updating associated file tables for any Linux image as well as for secondary
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file system updates. Additionally, a boot request entry must be written to the
system state logs such that a subsequent system reboot will attempt to use the
applied update. This boot request must only be written if the software update is
properly validated after being copied to its destination.
4.3.3 Software Update Validation
When the software update process receives a command to apply a system update,
it will use the provided MD5 and compare it to one calculated on the desired
update file. If the update does not exist or the update file cannot be validated,
the command is not accepted and a corresponding error code is generated by the
process. If the desired update file is validated, it will be copied to its destination
depending on the update type.
For Linux images, this destination is the second available image-set slot in
PCM, and for a secondary file system update, this is any destination path pro-
vided with the command. The destination path for a secondary file system update
may or may not be a file that already exists on the file system. In case the file to
update already exists on the file system, the preexisting file is simply overwritten
when the update is validated and applied. Since these updates cannot be reflected
immediately for either the primary Linux images or the secondary file system, a
subsequent reboot is required to apply the software update.
After a Linux image is copied to the PCM, the image is validated once again
by reading it from the PCM. This process is done to account for and correct any
transient memory disruptions that may have ultimately corrupted the update
image. Once the image is fully validated this way, its associated file table in
the system state log must be updated. Since these file tables are parsed by the
bootstrap upon startup, it is necessary to update them to reflect the existing
system state. The latest file table entry associated with the software update is
scanned, and information regarding the update image is inserted into the file
table. This information includes version, memory address offset, length, and
MD5. All of these fields are critical information necessary for the bootstrap to
properly load the system image on subsequent system startup. Lastly, a boot
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request is placed within the system state logs to request the system to use this
update on next startup.
After a secondary file system update is applied, the file is validated after being
copied to its designated partition in NAND. This is done similarly to a Linux
image update to detect any potential memory corruption that may occur. Once
the update is validated, the corresponding secondary file table entry is updated
similarly to how the Linux image file tables are updated. However, the MD5
and length fields are disregarded since they are not relevant to the secondary
file system. The next important step is only necessary for secondary file system
updates, which requires the directory listing that contains the new update file to
also be updated. This is performed by determining whether the software update
is a new or preexisting file, and updating the directory listing entry accordingly.
Lastly, a boot request is placed in the system state logs to request the system to
mount this file system on next startup.
An overall flow diagram representing this process’s behavior is shown in Fig-
ure 4.10:
A couple important considerations should be acknowledged prior to any user
requesting the system to apply an update. The version number that’s provided
with a software update should not conflict with any preexisting version numbers
for the Linux images or secondary file system partitions. In other words, system
images or secondary file system partitions with the same version can exist, but
any update applied to the system should reflect this properly. If two partitions
are marked as the same version but contain different file tree hierarchies, this
desynchronization could result in undesirable error occurrences.
4.3.4 System Upset Tolerance
To ensure the update process does not cause additional upsets in the system, its
specific order of steps have been designed to prevent further upsets. In summary,
these steps include copying the software update, final validation, updating a file
table, and writing a boot request in this respective order. During any part of
the update process, if a step happens to fail or prematurely exit due to a system
reset, the system will not try to use the update.
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Figure 4.10: Software Update Application Phase - This diagram illustrates
the validation and application steps performed by the final update Linux process.
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All of these items depend on each other uniquely such that they must all exist
in proper form to apply an update. More specifically, updated files tables must
properly reflect the state of the Linux images or secondary file systems before a
boot request can be used. Lastly, the software update content contained in PCM
or NAND flash must be valid before it can be used, and this step is performed
before any file tables are updated. Thus, if any part is missing that another
depends on, the software update is not applied.
4.3.5 Design Success
This subsystem has been successfully implemented and tested to meet the desired
requirements. A Linux process has been written to perform all necessary subtasks,
some of which have been implemented with preexisting solutions that already
exist in the avionics software architecture.
One main component is the ability to send and receive commands that should
be transmitted over RF to enable remote commanding. Fortunately, being able
to receive and send commands on the spacecraft was simply added to the process.
The standard software architecture on the avionics actually uses Unix sockets to
perform interprocess communication (IPC), which has also been integrated for
use with RF communication.
The second requirement states that this subsystem must perform necessary
file table and boot request entry updates as a final step to apply an update. This
functionality has been successfully implemented in the process, and the updated
file table and boot request entries are inserted into the system state logs to apply
a system update. Much of the information necessary to update these entries is
included with the update request command parameters, such as desired version
type, and associated MD5. However, preexisting boot request and file table
entries are taken into account since their preexisting state must also be reflected
in new entries (i.e., preexisting entry information may need to be merged with
new entries).
A couple primary testing techniques have been used to validate this sub-
system. To test remote communication capability of this process, commands
to apply software updates were sent using a preexisting command client. This
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client was developed for other testing on the avionics and has sufficed for similar
communication testing. Overall, simple commands were first tested for receive
functionality and for commanding software updates. Commands to update either
a Linux image or secondary root file system were successfully received, and any
error codes that were generated by the process were successfully retransmitted.
To test software update application functionality, the process was commanded
to perform all three types of potential software updates independently. One of
each type of update was transferred to temporary NAND storage, and then copied
to their respective destination devices as the updates were applied.
To ensure individual Linux images were applied properly, the expected kernel
and root file system image versions were viewed upon system startup. The over-
all system log state is printed at startup, and this capability was leveraged for
some of this testing. Initially, the first boot cycle used specific versions of these
images for startup, and these were noted. After a system image was updated,
the expected version number change was verified on subsequent system startup.
Additionally, the overall state of the file table entries and boot requests were
viewed for verification. An extremely similar setup was used to test secondary
file system updates with single file updates.
Lastly, manual resets of the avionics platform were conducted during different
phases of the update process to simulate unexpected system resets. This was done
to ensure the system would not create additional upsets upon subsequent startup
if the software update did not succeed. Resets were performed intermittently
during the final validation, file table, and boot request entry update phases.
Upon system reset, no unexpected error occurrences were observable and the
system was still able to boot using the original secondary file system partition or
Linux images. The software update process could still run successfully to apply
an update even after experiencing an intermittent system reset.
An overview of the primary test cases and their results are presented in Ta-
ble 4.3.
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Table 4.3: Final Update Tests and Results
Primary Test Result
Remote command transaction Received and executed
Error code generation Generated by invalid command or other error
File table entries updated Validated on subsequent reboot
Boot requests updated Validated on subsequent reboot
Reset at different phases No further upsets encountered
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Each major subsystem has been individually tested and verified, and this chapter
briefly discusses the overall system design success and compliance with origi-
nal system requirements. The system was designed to provide software update
functionality for critical components of the avionics system, and to conduct this
process reliably by considering validation and recovery. This system has achieved
the desired functional behavior and met system requirements.
5.1 System Success
After each subsystem was independently tested, they were integrated as a whole
unit to perform system state logging, recovery from invalid software updates,
validation, and the application of software updates. Each of these subsystems
currently work in unison and have been tested together to achieve overall desired
software update functionality.
This system has resulted in two main processes that execute at startup. One
is responsible for validation and recovery of the secondary file system as well as
writing boot success messages. The other is responsible purely for cleaning and
synchronization of the system state logs. Additionally, a third process is executed
on the avionics for final application of the software updates when a remote request
is provided.
Each major goal of the system has been realized, and a summary of this is
provided in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Desired Goals and Status
System Goal Status
Support for major component software updates Achieved
Validation and recovery of software updates Achieved
Tolerance of system upsets Achieved
Extensible solution for avionics Achieved
This system does not only apply to a single mission, but it is tightly integrated
with the current software and hardware architecture of the avionics. Since it is
anticipated that these architectures will not vary much for future missions, this
software update system can and should be used on future missions.
To some degree, tolerance of system upsets has been achieved. The overall
system is designed to handle potential resets that may occur during the update
process and recover if necessary. A concern during system design was handling
memory corruption of any element in PCM, including the system state logs and
Linux images. To handle these cases, these images are validated on startup and
recovery is performed as necessary with backup images or backup secondary file
system partitions. Additionally, if an upset occurs that corrupts data in either
system state log, whether it’s a radiation induced bit flip or a reset occurs while
log entries are being written, the other log copy can be used to resynchronize
the two. Overall, bit flip corruption is tolerated for any region of memory in the
PCM except for the bootstrap region, or the log regions if both happen to become
corrupt.
Unfortunately, these scenarios are unrecoverable. For example, if the system
can not boot for some reason using any set of images within the PCM or because
the bootstrap region is corrupt, this would result in a mission failure. In this
case, a software update could not be applied to attempt to recover the system.
Additionally, if both system state logs are corrupted such that they cannot be
synchronized, this may result in undesirable behavior, or an inaccurate system
state representation at startup.
Lastly, all system requirements have been met, and these are summarized in
Table 5.2. Each requirement was met and verified in different ways. The right-
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hand column presents summarized justifications for how each system requirement
was met.
Table 5.2: System Requirements and Verification
System Requirement Justification
Compatible with overall avionics Solution developed for avionics
Available RF support hardware Functional remote file transfer
High latency remote data transfer Preexisting solutions for support
Temporary update storage NAND flash utilization
Small memory footprint updates Average 1-2 MB footprint
Minor changes between missions Only a couple foreseen
Specific formats Supports compressed images or individual files
System recovery Verified with system testing
Robust and low overhead validation MD5 checksum and system performance
Tolerance of unexpected upsets Verified with system testing
Application of software updates Verified with system testing
5.2 Additional Results
A couple additional performance tests were conducted to measure the overhead
incurred from the new startup, validation, and recovery procedures. The most
costly procedure is the validation and recovery of the secondary file system. After
a series of time tests using the Linux time utility, an average wall-clock time of
20 seconds is required for validation and single file recovery. These tests were
conducted with an empty microprocessor cache to emulate system startup.
Although this performance is not ideal, the system still recovers and validates
properly, which is the most important result. Currently, no planned missions
depend on a quicker validation of the secondary file system. An extension to this
validation procedure has been considered, and it has been partially developed.
This feature is priority-based file validation, which is performed by simply includ-
ing a file that contains entry names of files that are validated in a priority fashion
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before any others. If any files need quicker validation for a future mission, this
feature can be fully developed.
Secondly, an average time to clean the system state logs was obtained to
estimate the overhead of a worst-case log clean procedure. Depending on the
number of entries to delete, the cleaning process may require several more or less
seconds than the results provided. The test was conducted with cases of deleting
5 and 15 entries. The average wall-clock time to complete the cleaning of these
entry sets was approximately 2 to 5 seconds. Although these results are useful
to note, the cleaning process may only ever need to clean 1 to 2 entries at a
time because they are cleaned at every system startup. Thus, the performance
overhead from cleaning and synchronizing the system state logs may only ever
require milliseconds of time.
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During the design and development phase of this thesis, a variety of works were
evaluated for guidance. A series of papers that influenced major design decisions
are summarized and detailed descriptions of their contributions to this thesis are
presented. A summary of each design decision is presented below:
1. To store software updates and images reliably, a few decisions were made
regarding the different memory components and in what fashion they’re
stored. Eventually, the decision to place critical data on a non-volatile
phase-change memory device was made to limit the potential radiation ef-
fects that may occur and upset the system. Discussion of the research
investigating the benefits of using phase-change memory in a space envi-
ronment, specifically its inherent radiation tolerance, are presented.
2. NAND memory technology has a variety of attributes that must be consid-
ered to use it effectively and retain its lifetime. These attributes exist due
to its manufacturing process and internal structure. More detail about this
internal structure and a preexisting solution used on the avionics to help
utilize this technology efficiently are discussed.
3. The system state log maintained provides capabilities necessary for software
updates, such as recovery in case of update failure, and software update
application requests. It provides common features found in many other
log-based implementations for other applications, such as checkpointing and
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rollback techniques for error recovery. The system state log used for software
updates was designed with the guidance of these works.
6.1 Ionizing Radiation Tolerant Non-Volatile
Memory
Since doses of ionizing radiation can cause undesirable memory upsets and poten-
tially incorrect software behavior, mechanisms to assist in limiting or preventing
drastic consequence from these circumstances should be employed. The platform
hardware designer initially chose to utilize a structural phase-change non-volatile
memory in an unknown fashion, but additional research showed that storing the
most critical data (i.e., kernel and root file system images) on this device would
potentially result in more desirable behavior on the avionics. For example, if the
kernel and root file system become corrupted on-orbit, the system would fail to
reboot or not boot at all and the planned mission could not continue. Storing
this data on such a device should help to prevent such occurrences.
These papers [22, 23, 24] discuss the underlying technology behind phase-
changing, or chalcogenide memory cells (PCM) and their effectiveness to tolerate
the space environment.
6.1.1 Phase Change Memory Overview
PCM technology utilizes chalcogenide based alloys within memory cells by rep-
resenting bit states with two different structural phases of a specific alloy, rather
than with traditional electrical charge. These two unique structural forms, known
as amorphous and polycrystalline states, exhibit different but identifiable optical
and resistive properties, thus allowing for representation of standard electrical
bit states. Adjusting the alloy physically requires thermal activation, which is
achieved by applying different levels of electrical potential to heat the material
at varying periods of time. Ultimately, these cells require no extra energy to
maintain, but only to set various structural phases. This creates an inherently
non-volatile and radiation tolerant memory device [24].
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As rare as it seems, this technology has actually been commercially used in
CD and DVD disk production for several years. When writing data to a disk, a
high-power laser thermally forms differently phased memory cells whose states are
then read with a low-power laser by pointing and measuring different reflections
produced from each cell. Fortunately, continued developments have improved
this technology and made it a suitable device for this avionics platform.
6.1.2 Attractive Features
Although this memory behaves differently from standard non-volatile semicon-
ductor memory (e.g., EEPROM, flash), there are a number of features in addi-
tion to invulnerability to ionizing radiation that make it an attractive standard
memory alternative for space applications. This technology also has reduced sus-
ceptibility to harsh thermal environments while maintaining low manufacturing
costs, low power consumption, and achieving DRAM speeds [22]. It also utilizes a
standard electrical bus interface and practical physical size for simple integration
into this platform. These features form a strong argument for establishing this
unique memory permanently onto this platform. Furthermore, experimentation
to help measure its actual robustness to radiation exposure has been conducted
and summarized results are provided.
6.1.3 Evaluating Upset Susceptibility
Despite existing models of expected radiation doses within certain spacecraft
orbits, the actual absorbed radiation by electronic components will vary due
to factors such as the current solar cycle, and exact proximity to the Earth’s
poles [25]. Additionally, depending on the microelectronic device, upsets can
occur with exposure ranges between 1000 rad(Si) and 10 Mrad [26]. Thus, to ac-
curately evaluate electronic component tolerance with radiation levels similar to
those in space is difficult. However, a couple experiments conducted in these pa-
pers measure susceptibility to upset or latchup events with comparable radiation
exposure [23, 24].
For both experiments, variations in successfully reading bits (i.e., reading back
expected bit states after writing) occurred with increased irradiation of different
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PCM devices. One experiment tested with a 64 Kbit memory array while the
other with a 4 Mbit using exposure levels between 0 and 30 Mrad. However,
the occurrence of incorrect reads due to these upsets was low at high irradiation
levels and did not affect the actual memory cell contents since further subsequent
reads were successful.
Based on these results, utilizing a PCM device on the avionics suits as an
ideal application. Since the kernel and file system images, including potential
backups, are read only during boot from the PCM, the number of expected read
operations performed should be minimal. Utilizing the PCM in this fashion will
help to prevent critical system memory corruption that may occur and recovery
from potential read failures during boot, both of which are crucial for mission
success.
6.2 Important Considerations for NAND
Memory
Flash memory has become the standard for embedded system non-volatile mem-
ory use due to several attractive features, such as low-power consumption and
low cost. Two distinct types exist, NAND and NOR, which in short, differ in
their memory cell arrangement. Each device has a cell arrangement that corre-
sponds similarly (at the transistor level) to how NOR or NAND logic gates are
architected [11], hence their naming. This creates fundamental interfacing dif-
ferences between both types and necessitates considerations of how each should
be employed. These papers [27, 28] discuss the limitations of NAND technology
that were considered prior to its use on the avionics, and offers existing solutions
designed to extend device lifetime and improve reliability.
6.2.1 Issues with NAND Flash
Despite the number of advantages, some disadvantages exist that should be recog-
nized. The serially structured memory cells within a NAND device facilitate high
storage density, but this means data cannot be accessed randomly like in RAM
devices. Thus, a serial method to read or write data in large subsets known as
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pages must be used instead of other common addressing schemes that access data
in a truly random (i.e., byte-wise) fashion. This introduces extra overhead when
reading from or writing to a NAND device, and may reduce efficiency depending
on the circumstance (e.g., only a subset of the data is needed from a single page
read). This serial behavior does not significantly degrade performance for the
avionics since the average number of read and write operations would be minimal
for applications on current missions. This should still be noted since this may
differ for future missions.
Another issue is anticipated page failure caused from imperfect manufacturing
processes, and inherit limited lifetime of the memory. Typically, sections of the
memory known as blocks have a limited number of write cycles before completely
deteriorating, and some blocks are expected to be damaged directly after man-
ufacturing. To avoid using these blocks, the manufacturer will test and “mark”
any as reference so they are not used. To limit producing bad blocks and to de-
tect and avoid newly formed bad blocks, software solutions have been developed
and proposed in these papers. Since integration of such a solution allows for a
subset of tolerable memory failures and improved robustness, these options were
explored. Fortunately, these solutions happen to exist in the form of file systems,
several of which Linux already supports.
6.2.2 YAFFS2 Utilization
Yet Another Flash File System (YAFFS) was originally developed as the first
optimized NAND file system for Linux, and it is also used by the popular An-
droid mobile software stack [27]. YAFFS2 was established soon after to support
additional features for current NAND flash devices, and it eventually became an
addition to the avionics Linux build.
The features provided from this file system make it an ideal candidate for
improving reliability of a NAND device. The design of this file system attempts
to prolong the total lifetime of the memory by utilizing dynamic wear leveling
techniques. These techniques uniformly distribute several write operations among
multiple, instead of single blocks [28]. Ultimately, this limits the number of
write cycles performed on individual blocks such that they degrade slower over
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time. YAFFS2 also employs bad block management methods that perform write
verification and remapping of data to new blocks in the event of write operation
or entire block failure [27]. Such features should provide extreme benefit to the
system, especially in the form of a robust and well-tested file system.
6.3 Log-based Rollback Techniques For Error
Recovery
Log-based and checkpoint-based rollback recovery protocols have been a prime
subject of research for some time due to their core issues and the solutions devel-
oped for them. Log-based or checkpoint-based rollback recovery is used to rewind
the system state to a previous known or preserved working state if a failure is
encountered. Among other systems, distributed systems make use of rollback
recovery techniques for error recovery similar to the log-based technique used in
this thesis. The papers [29, 30, 31] were evaluated for guidance during its design.
6.3.1 Distributed Systems and Parallel Applications
A distributed system typically uses multiple nodes to act as a cluster to perform
extreme large-scale computations. For several applications, this is a more efficient
solution than one that could be developed serially [30]. However, unless these
nodes can handle errors gracefully by perhaps recovering to a previous state, the
distributed system will eventually degrade in its performance and overall service
as nodes encounter errors. One of the most common fault tolerant techniques
used for these parallel applications is checkpoint-based rollback recovery.
6.3.2 Checkpoint-based Rollback Recovery
Generally, the checkpoint-based rollback recovery protocol periodically store the
snapshots of a system’s application or multi-application state in order to be re-
stored if ever necessary. One major problem to consider is known as the domino
effect, where under some recovery scenarios, rollback may be propagated so deep
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that all previous computational work completed by one or multiple nodes is
lost [31].
There are three primary types of checkpoint-based rollback recovery proto-
cols, two of which are not vulnerable to the domino effect. The first type of
checkpoint-based protocol is known as an uncoordinated checkpointing scheme.
This essentially means any node or application executing on a node decides when
to save its local state into ‘stable’ memory. It’s assumed that a reliable memory
source exists on which this state can be stored, which is categorized as a ‘stable’
device. This type of protocol is actually less complex than others, but does suffer
from the disadvantage of the domino effect.
Coordinated checkpointing is the second type of protocol where all nodes
or applications must organize and synchronize their individual checkpoints such
that a single consistent application checkpoint is generated and saved [30]. In this
scenario, generating a checkpoint induces more system overhead and it’s usually
more complex. However, this significantly reduces the complexity of restoring a
preserved state since only a single checkpoint needs to be evaluated rather than
multiple. More importantly, this checkpointing scheme does not suffer from the
domino effect.
The last type is quasi-asynchronous, or communication-induced checkpoint-
ing, which is a hybrid of the previous two. This scheme does not require global
coordinated checkpointing and nodes can perform checkpoints leisurely, but some
applications or nodes can be forced or required to perform a checkpoint when nec-
essary. Forcing checkpoints results in the avoidance of the domino effect, but this
protocol is the most complex of the three.
6.3.3 Log-based Rollback Recovery
Log-based rollback recovery is an extension of checkpoint-based, except that it
involves message recording as an additional mechanism to save and restore state.
This rollback recovery technique is extremely similar to that of the system state
log solution designed in this thesis. One primary advantage is that this protocol
will result in a more recent state recovery during rollback than checkpoint-based
recovery. This behavior is usually desired because during recovery, losing the least
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amount of application state from error is more beneficial. In a distributed system,
all messages communicated among all nodes during checkpoint-based recovery are
now saved with a log-based rollback recovery system. Thus, their most recent
states prior to any error can easily be recalled.
This recovery technique depends on a piecewise deterministic model, which
assumes the system can be modeled as a sequence of deterministic states that
begin with the execution of a non-deterministic event [29]. A deterministic event
could be storing system state log entries at different startup points on the avionics,
while a non-deterministic event would be an unexpected system reset. Thus, the
system has complete knowledge of non-deterministic events that would transition
the system to a subsequent state if such an event occurred. For example, a non-
deterministic reset on the avionics prior to saving boot status success messages
during Linux startup will result in a retry to boot using the same Linux images.
This assumes the number of boot attempts has not been exceeded, since this is
required in order for a boot retry.
There are two primary types of log-based recovery protocols, one of which is
used in the system state logs. The first is known as a pessimistic or synchronized
logging technique, which records each event before the event actually takes place
on the system. This simplifies both the recovery and cleaning process for the
system state log. With this scheme, the system state does not depend on any
non-deterministic events that may not be able to be reproduced during recovery.
In other words, the state is only dependent on the deterministic events that are
logged, such as boot attempts, successes, and requests. Additionally, this only
requires that the most recent messages be contained in the log to reflect the
current system state. Older messages, or those with lower sequence numbers, can
simply be discarded for the cleaning process.
The last primary type is optimistic or asynchronous, which is more ambitious
and partially stores its state in volatile memory, as well as non-volatile. However,
this has the drawback of potentially losing critical state if the volatile memory
is recycled due to a system upset. Recovery is still possible, but most likely to a
less recent state since multiple rollbacks may be necessary. A pessimistic rollback
recovery type has been integrated into the system state log due to its overall
robustness, and simplified recovery and cleaning processes.
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7.1 System Success
The design and implementation of the software update feature-set for this plat-
form has been an exceptional learning experience and an overall success. Each
major subsystem has been developed to form a software update architecture that
achieves the desired system goals.
Software updates can now be remotely requested and performed on any major
part of the avionics system, including the Linux kernel, primary root file system,
and secondary file system. This software update feature-set has also been devel-
oped to support current and future missions, which is an invaluable characteristic.
Meeting these two primary goals provides the flexibility to support software up-
date functionality for various components on multiple missions, which may differ
depending on mission requirements and desired functionality. Validation is also
performed prior to any update being used, and recovery options are available if
perhaps the update becomes inoperable. Validation and recovery of critical sys-
tem elements, including Linux, is now always performed at startup to improve
the overall fault tolerance from potential system upsets. Lastly, each major sub-
system was designed to tolerate unexpected system upsets and does not induce
further upsets if such an event does occur.
Although there are many components that form this complex system, it’s
an extremely valuable and desirable solution to have for the avionics. In future
mission planning and mission considerations, the design process may drastically
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change given the flexibility now available with this system. For example, if ad-
ditional physical volume is available for a mission, a secondary payload could be
designed. This payload would not have to be related to the primary payload
and should not be mission critical, as the goal is not to deviate from the primary
mission. However, if this secondary payload is simple enough to design while stay-
ing within the desired timeline and budget for a mission, it could be developed,
tested, and flown. Development of the supporting software for this subsystem
could be completed perhaps after developing the primary mission functionality.
The key advantage is that this development could take place before or after the
satellite makes it to orbit.
The ability to update system software will most likely be leveraged more ex-
tensively to remedy issues in software applications that are detected post-launch.
Depending on the complexity of the mission, a variety of scenarios will not be
tested on the ground simply because there are so many. Additionally, there are
always errors encountered in space given the characteristics of the environment.
Hopefully, any encountered errors that may result are recoverable and can be
fixed by a software update. Recovery will most likely be necessary for several
future missions, whether the encountered errors are minor or major.
7.2 Current Progress
This feature-set has not yet flown on any missions, but all upcoming missions
should have this functionality enabled. All major subsystems, including system
state logging, validation, and recovery are functional and have been tested on the
avionics platform. A few convenient but minor additions are still missing that
should be added.
7.2.1 Build Integration
All of these features have yet to be integrated into the overall PolySat software
build system. As they were being developed, a build solution more suited for indi-
vidual development was used. Although this does not make it infeasible to use on
the avionics system, the necessary setup to currently integrate is almost entirely
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manual. Most of the preexisting build process, including generating Linux im-
ages and bootstrap binaries is automated, and integration of the software update
features should be done in a similar fashion.
More specifically, generation of the secondary file system directory listings is
done manually, as well as placing initial file table entries for both image sets into
the system state logs. Although the latter cannot easily be performed without
system startup, a small program to write these entries only once could be added
to Linux startup.
Secondly, only one partition of the secondary file system is flashed to NAND
by an auto-generated script when being programmed. This approach is used
for quicker development and testing on the avionics, but ultimately, a separate
flight script should be generated that flashes all five partitions. It would be an
unfortunate mistake to forget to flash all NAND partitions prior to conducting a
mission.
7.2.2 Test Modes
Developers frequently use the avionics platform to test many other software ap-
plications or hardware subsystems. The validation and recovery process used
for the secondary file system will always execute by default once upon avionics
startup, and this may not be necessary depending on what a developer may be
testing. Thus, a test mode should be defined that can enable and disable this
feature in case it becomes an inconvenience while testing other features.
This may also be true for log-based actions for the system state, such as clean-
ing entries. However, this procedure incurs much less overhead than secondary
file system validation, and it should not be an issue.
Although test modes are convenient, adding this functionality should be done
carefully. The developer should be aware of them and not always have them
enabled. Otherwise, testing this feature-set as an integrated unit with other
test applications may present future issues. It is better to always perform such
integrated testing early in case any issues may arise.
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7.3 Future Work
A variety of features to use this functionality in flight, as well as to enhance its
reliability can be added as an extension to this work. Three primary components
that would be immediately beneficial are described.
7.3.1 Command Structure and Organization
In order to test this system, a simple command set was developed for the final
validation and application phase for software updates. However, this command
set is probably not the most efficient and it could be designed better.
For example, the data transferred for the command to apply a kernel image
update included the full path name of the file. This is not the most efficient
way to request that an image update be applied to the system over RF. Thus,
a software update application command-set should definitely be redesigned for
overhead efficiency.
Secondly, organization of the update files in NAND could be better defined in
order to make the feature-set more user-friendly. For testing, a naming scheme
only known by myself was used to simply delineate between kernel and root file
system update versions, as well as their temporary location paths in NAND. This
should be predefined for all future missions and known by other developers than
just myself.
7.3.2 Kernel Log Entry
Currently, the boot status success entries for a specific kernel and root file system
image set are logged simultaneously at startup. These entries are written using a
user-space process, which means that it depends on the root file system mounting.
However, this forces a dependency between the two entries in that both images
must be valid in order for their individual success entry to be written. The system
state log and boot process are actually flexible enough to attempt booting with
perhaps a different root file system, or different kernel image if only one of them
happened to be invalid. With this dependency, the number of potentially valid
boot combinations for a set of images is reduced.
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To enable entry writing within the kernel, this must be done in kernel space
while also creating access to PCM. This kernel space functionality could easily
use the preexisting SPI device driver, but specific components regarding system
state log parsing and similar must be ported to kernel space.
7.3.3 Memory Write Protection
This is probably the most important component necessary to add to the system.
As previously mentioned, without a valid bootstrap, the system will not boot and
it cannot recover. Although nothing should be accessing the PCM device aside
from the couple user-space processes at startup, one may unintentionally attempt
to write to the wrong address, and this may be fatal.
This is a simple extra precautionary measure that will probably prove ex-
tremely valuable sometime in the future. The easiest solution is to add the series
of region write-protection commands to the PCM from the host memory flashing
application. The PCM is flashed using an executable on a host machine that is
responsible for placing all Linux dependencies and bootstrap onto on PCM. This
host application already has an existing interface to the PCM and thus, it would
most likely be a minor addition in order to support memory protection behavior.
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